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Linux isn't vulnerable by default, because it's missing features by default. It has no equivalent of Active Directory, and doesn't use Kerberos or anything like
by jiggawatts 6y ago
Linux isn't vulnerable by default, because it's missing features by default. It has no equivalent of Active Directory, and doesn't use Kerberos or anything like it by default.
However, it can, at which point you're back to the same problem. The vulnerability is with the protocol, not the operating system.
Modern versions of Active Directory enable strong protections for Kerberos that almost entirely stops the majority of the Pass-the-Hash or the Golden Ticket attacks. However, this isn't on by default even in Windows Server 2019 running a domain in 2019 mode for "compatibility" reasons.
I put that in air quotes because it's an excuse, and this is where Microsoft has consistently dropped the ball. They refuse to change security defaults, even when it starts getting absurd, and then lay the responsibility (and blame) at the feet of their customers.
For example, domain trusts between two Windows Server 2019 DCs will use NT4-era RC4 ciphers by default, downgrading all AES-capable devices across the trust.
Similarly, newly created accounts will always default to RC4, allowing downgrade attacks.
SMB is neither signed, nor encrypted by default.
Up until very recently, Windows Server has TLS 1.1 and 1.2, but they were disabled. Now, they're enabled, but so is TLS 1.0!
So on, and so forth.
That's the real issue. It's not that Windows is "crypto illiterate". That's like a person who can't read. No, it's like a person that can read but refuses to.
- omnibrain 6y ago> They refuse to change security defaults, even when it starts getting absurd, and then lay the responsibility (and blame) at the feet of their customers. They changed a lot of security defaults with Windows Vista and literally(figuratively) everybody dumped on them. It got called worst Windows ever, unusable, and names I don’t want to spell out from the public and the press. That made them reluctant to attempt such drastic measures again. But at least they disable SMBv1 by default nowadays.
- jiggawatts 6y agoThe crypto wasn't at all the criticism most (any?) people had with Vista. My criticism is that they didn't implement the Vista-era crypto enough. In 2020, most Microsoft software doesn't support ECC certificates because their server products are still written to use the 2000/XP/2003 era crypto APIs instead of the Vista and later crypto APIs. I remind you that none of those operating systems are supported any longer, but apparently for "comptibility reasons" SQL Server 2019, AD FS 2019, and System Centre 2019 can't use elliptic certs. Or use TPM-hosted certs. Or anything at all really other than RSA 2048-bit certs stored in software. IIS can, but that's the lone exception, not the rule.
- vetinari 6y ago> Linux isn't vulnerable by default, because it's missing features by default. It has no equivalent of Active Directory, and doesn't use Kerberos or anything like it by default. Could you tell more why do you think so? For what I remember, Linux in this regard is exactly the same as Windows: you have to install and configure Samba 4 or FreeIPA in order to get a kerberized domain; you also have to join the clients into domain exactly the same way you would join windows clients. In Windows, your servers out of the box won't run the necessary services, you have to install the AD DS server role. You have to join the clients into domain. So there's nothing like AD or Kerberos on Windows by default either.
- tialaramex 6y agoFirst of all we should distinguish that while Golden Ticket is potentially viable on other Kerberos and Kerberos-style systems Pass-the-hash is a security vulnerability per se and outside of Windows it would just be given a CVE number and you'd be expected to fix it not write that "Mitigation is not practical" and act as though it isn't your fault. In fact it has been given a CVE number and fixed in obscure systems where it was done, only Windows gets to shrug and say it's hard so we won't fix it. e.g. CVE-2005-3435 In Windows every user - anywhere in the world not just within one organisation - with the same password has the same hash. Worse than a PHP app from the turn of the century their most sophisticated password hash scheme is MD4(password). This makes the mistake that results in Pass-the-hash almost irresistible. Because a Linux system uses salted (and pessimised) hashes, it is not tempting to try to authenticate remote hashes because you're going to have to build a multi-step protocol, passing parameters to the client so it can perform the hash. You'd probably instead look at existing protocols and discover SRP (or in the modern era any sensible asymmetric PAKE). This immediately shows you a better path forwards with no Pass-the-hash. But because Windows has this constant 16-byte hash it is tempting to use that for authentication. You can do a bit of hand waving to avoid confronting how insecure the result is: ‣ Bad guys can't possibly know this 128-bit value because it's MD4(password) and there's no way to find that without knowing password. Therefore we only need to check that the 128-bit value is correct and we've authenticated the user. ‣ Storing the 128-bit value locally is fine because it's MD4(password) and you can't reverse MD4 to get the password back so it's not a secret. Only when you see these arguments next to each other it is obvious this is absurd. So long as they're on different pages of a document, or preferably made in entirely separate discussions at Microsoft, the mistake is unnoticed. You've engaged in the same equivocation that Microsoft uses by adding "or Golden Ticket attacks". Microsoft documents about Pass-the-hash routinely argue that this is just the same as any other stolen credentials attack, so it's not Windows at fault nobody could be expected to do better. This is definitively wrong and we need to call them out on it.