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Is there an option where we don't act like consciousness is solved when it's convenient for our argument? > Reply to above: If consciousness is fundamental, t
by zarmin 6y ago
Is there an option where we don't act like consciousness is solved when it's convenient for our argument?
> Reply to above:
If consciousness is fundamental, the "purely mechanical" explanation is not purely mechanical.
I've found HackerNews to be broadly allergic to the idea of nonlocal consciousness, and worldviews that are not material reductionism. Nevertheless, I will once again point to the work of Dean Radin, among others, to demonstrate that these are not unfalsifiable claims.
- bena 6y agoI think the problem with both of your arguments is that neither of you will be able to actually define consciousness in a way that is satisfactory to the other party. Which is cool. Because we don't really fundamentally understand what it actually is. We have a rough feeling, but any definition we put forth will either also be satisfied by something you both agree is not conscious or not be satisfied by something you both agree is conscious. So we can't really say if it is emergent or fundamental. And it may even be a property of purely mechanical elements.
- benlivengood 6y agoIf consciousness is non-local or non-mechanical then it has a lot of very weird rules about physical and chemical things that can be done to brains to alter it.