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What if consciousness is fundamental instead of emergent?

• ebg13 6y ago
  > What if consciousness is fundamental instead of emergent? And what if Wolverine was Lord of the Vampires? Speculative fiction is still speculative and still fiction. See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgan%27s_Canon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgan%27s_Canon https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Newton%27s_flaming_laser_sword https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Newton%27s_flaming_laser_swor...
  • zarmin 6y ago
    I'm reminded of this quote: > we don't understand where our consciousness comes from
    • ebg13 6y ago
      Your two options are: 1. Make something up about whether consciousness is fundamental and run with it. 2. Don't make anything up when you don't need to, because we can answer how plants follow the sun without needing to talk about consciousness, just like we can answer how an automatic door opens for me when I get close without deciding to call it conscious. > From below: Is there an option where we don't act like consciousness is solved when it's convenient for our argument? You're saying "Consciousness isn't solved, therefore we should imagine that these things are conscious." I'm saying "Consciousness isn't solved and that's irrelevant because we have purely mechanical explanations for these things that don't require imagining that they're conscious." Because a lightbulb's glow when I push a button or flip a switch _might_ be a sign of the lightbulb's consciousness, but that's 1) not necessary and 2) purely made up and deep into Russell's teapot.
      • zarmin 6y ago
        Is there an option where we don't act like consciousness is solved when it's convenient for our argument? > Reply to above: If consciousness is fundamental, the "purely mechanical" explanation is not purely mechanical. I've found HackerNews to be broadly allergic to the idea of nonlocal consciousness, and worldviews that are not material reductionism. Nevertheless, I will once again point to the work of Dean Radin, among others, to demonstrate that these are not unfalsifiable claims.
        • bena 6y ago
          I think the problem with both of your arguments is that neither of you will be able to actually define consciousness in a way that is satisfactory to the other party. Which is cool. Because we don't really fundamentally understand what it actually is. We have a rough feeling, but any definition we put forth will either also be satisfied by something you both agree is not conscious or not be satisfied by something you both agree is conscious. So we can't really say if it is emergent or fundamental. And it may even be a property of purely mechanical elements.
        • benlivengood 6y ago
          If consciousness is non-local or non-mechanical then it has a lot of very weird rules about physical and chemical things that can be done to brains to alter it.
      • spaetzleesser 6y ago
        "I'm saying "Consciousness isn't solved and that's irrelevant because we have purely mechanical explanations for these things that don't require imagining that they're conscious." " Seems you don't really believe in consciousness which is fine. In the end whatever humans think consciousness is can probably also be explained with mechanical explanations.