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> You must make security features extremely easy to use and ergonomic above all else (even above being secure!). That's definitely not right. The correct secu
by tialaramex 6y ago
> You must make security features extremely easy to use and ergonomic above all else (even above being secure!).
That's definitely not right.
The correct security design is that when things aren't secure you fail entirely. This will sometimes be very annoying but the temptation to prefer not failing leads to disaster. Instead an organisation that prioritises security must dedicate resources to resolving the actual security problem as a priority because it is very annoying.
For example 'thisisunsafe' and its predecessor 'badidea' are indeed, unsafe and a bad idea. The correct design is to simply fail instead. Which organisation do you think gets successfully phished with invalid HTTPS certificates - the Chrome embracing organisation that has taught people they can just type "thisisunsafe" or the one where everybody uses Firefox and it brick walls when HSTS denies access?
> Nobody is going to willingly agree to abandon their productivity or flexibility for your security tool or policy.
This is almost correct. Humans are very lazy. They will give up their productivity or flexibility for your security tool or policy if it's easier than the alternative.
For example when your users are trying to give their credentials to bad guys, you need to make this so difficult they give up.
You might think you can train your users not to want to give their credentials to bad guys, but this is unlikely to be successful enough to bother. Instead get to a place where your users, even though they really want to help the bad guys, just can't see an easy way to do it.
They may even file a helpdesk ticket because they genuinely don't realise what they're trying to do would be a very bad idea. Try not to be smug when responding to the ticket.
- p1necone 6y agoWhen things that people need to do fail entirely, people will develop hacky, under the radar alternatives.
- mlthoughts2018 6y ago> The correct security design is that when things aren't secure you fail entirely. Yikes, this is extremely wrong. Security failures should be proportional to the actual cost and consequences. On top of this, you can’t just fail systems in a business. You’ll lose all your customers and go bankrupt. On the other hand, you _can_ allow security vulnerabilities to continue existing. Sometimes you might lose customers or face legal consequences, so you might _have to_ address those security situations, but they are in the rare minority of all security issues overall, many of which you just need to apply expected value thinking towards and treat like any other trade-off. Security is a resource to be traded off against other concerns, not an absolute necessity.
- panta 6y agoYou are right in that security is a trade-off, but a security vulnerability should be considered almost as a failed system from a business perspective imho, because sooner or later it will turn into one. If you architect your systems to fail when not secure, you should detect the problem (and fix it) even before going live in production. It’s the fail fast, fail early strategy.
- tialaramex 6y ago> Security failures should be proportional to the actual cost and consequences. That's wonderful for Nostradamus, but everybody else is obliged to operate without knowledge of the future. What will the actual consequences be of bad guys being able to send email from the VP Asia Pacific's account to the CFO's office five minutes before close of business? Maybe nothing right? Or maybe an "urgent cash payment" of $48M to secure a take over deal vanishes into a maze of international accounts never to be recovered... Security is a special problem because you have unknown sentient adversaries. You completely lack intelligence about the adversary because you don't even know who they are. Don't think about security decisions the way you'd think about decisions like whether to hire a back-up venue in case the company picnic is rained off.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]