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>The breach resulted from the printing of the bank's encrypted master key in plain, unencrypted digital language at the Postbank's old data centre in the Pretor
by duxup 6y ago
>The breach resulted from the printing of the bank's encrypted master key in plain, unencrypted digital language at the Postbank's old data centre in the Pretoria city centre
I can't read anymore. Is there anymore technical explanation?
Was it actually 'printed' ... on paper?
Was it even an actual encryption key or just a password or something?
- jdsully 6y agoPeople print their bitcoin keys all the time. Sometimes physical security is easier than electronic - current situation not withstanding.
- heavenlyblue 6y agoNo it’s not
- moftz 6y agoAn A-Z character string written inside random page a book stored at a relative's house is a super easy way to secure a physical backup of your private key. You could even get clever and encrypt the key using some memorable passage of another book. Since the book passage is unknown to anyone else and be selected from a near infinite pool of paragraphs from the entirety of all published books, it would be impossible for someone to bruteforce even if they found the book where you stored the encrypted key. This would be an easy enough process to generate the ciphertext and store it in the event that you totally lost access to all of your electronics, online accounts, and home.
- heavenlyblue 6y agoYou are not adding any more security than that if you simply remembering some random key (which isn’t that hard if you put your mind to it).
- ajdlinux 6y agoDon't forget the I and the A in the CIA triad, which are likely to be improved by keeping things recorded in writing.
- doc_gunthrop 6y agoSometimes it is: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage
- heavenlyblue 6y agoYou could just save it on a flash drive and hide it in safe. How does printing it on a piece of paper make it any safer?
- doc_gunthrop 6y agoDid you even bother viewing the linked page? > The advantage is that any security issues of USB interfaces or cameras are completely avoided. There's also the section that enumerates all the downsides for each medium of storage: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage#Private_key_backup_storage https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage#Private_key_backup_s...
- lmm 6y agoWith paper you can be confident that you will still be able to read it in decades. How true is that of a flash drive?
- inp 6y agoEven KeePass recommends to write the master secret key on a piece of paper. Sure, it must be in a secure place, but we cannot avoid this step for reliability.
- timothy-quinn 6y agoProbably a backup. It makes sense to have an offline backup in cleartext (for DR), as long as you have the appropriate storage and security controls in place to protect it.
- brohee 6y agoIt makes absolutely no sense. Such highly valuable secrets are usually saved using Shamir's secret sharing with parts of the split secret held by people unlikely to collude. Key ceremonies are done in a way that at no point a human being is in position to single-handedly extract the secret from its HSM. This is a huge failure.
- m4rtink 6y agoWhat surprises me is that you can extract the private key at all - I would expect it to be firmly inside a HSM, that only accepts signing requests and the key never leaves the module & the HSM wipes the key if it detects tampering (there is usually a battery inside to power the tampering detection even if the device is not plugged in). So just exporting the private key so easily without some pretty involved hight-tech HSM key extraction sounds insane.
- closeparen 6y agoI worked on a new internal PKI, nothing as high stakes as banking, but we did have a security consultant who had been around the block. We did, of course, purchase such HSMs and design a signing ceremony. But in his opinion it was also normal and expected to keep a decryptable copy of the private key, in case of e.g. changing HSM vendors. It would be even less accessible, but it would exist.
- m4rtink 6y agoThat's a good point - I guess if you know what you are doing then I guess it's fine.
- brohee 6y ago
- gcbw3 6y agoPeople seem to forget why credit cards came into existence. It was not for security. Ever. Credit Cards were introduced as a less-secure-but-more-convenient-check. The store then would have a stock of "blank checks" with absolutely no security features where they would imprint with carbon paper and a pressure roll the credit card information and pretty much "mint" the client a check on the spot. Over time the raised letters for the crude minting press morphed into a magnetic strip, but the process was still 100% the same. Outside of the US in the last decade (2yrs in the US) some little security was added with encryption keys and PINs. Which is nothing more than a digital signature the bank may or may not check (like it did with the actual signature on the previous mentioned blank checks minted by the store). This is the step that was compromised with the stolen keys. In other words, the few places where you have to insert your card chip into a reader and type a pin had their security degraded to the same level as places where you simply use your magnetic strip or type your numbers on an online store.
- celticninja 6y agoThe few places is everywhere in the EU at least. Signing card transactions is very last century in more advanced nations. ;) Edit: also the pin is verified each Transaction unlike with receipt signatures, which as you say were rarely checked by anyone.
- duxup 6y ago>also the pin is verified each Transaction unlike with receipt signatures At least in my experience this has increased a great deal more in the US in recent years.
- munk-a 6y agoAlso, nearly everywhere in Canada, the interac system really has it together up here.
- joecool1029 6y agoIt helps having one debit card system to support. The US has like 7 and I couldn't begin to name most of them (Interlink is one of them, I think Maestro is another)
- motohagiography 6y agoWhile the details are sparse, in card payments, you typically use an HSM and provision keys to card blanks using the EMV "personalization" protocol. It derives a bunch of keys from the master secret, and the whole chain of trust is based on these key derivations. These are symmetric keys/secrets, since most chip cards don't have the processing power for RSA, and ECC is still too recent for some of these legacy payment systems. What it means is that the master secret in the HSM is probably a 128bit AES key. The ways to generate this depend on the ceremony and the particular HSM, but the risk I have encountered in security consulting is the question of whether that master secret itself was just derived from simple components, like pbkdf2("secret phrase known to 3 people", 1000) The consequence of compromising that key is that an attacker could use it to forge cards, or more usefully, instantiate a virtual card in software to fuzz cryptograms for different account numbers to get available balance information and then personalize cards for those.
- manfredo 6y agoIsn't paper actually one of the more secure storage mediums? If you asked me the best way to store a secret I'd say put it on paper and lock it in a safe. I'd probably do something like print a QR code with an encrypted secret and store the key on a separate printed QR code.
- cjhveal 6y agoPaper in this context is a form of cold storage, you could get very similar results encoding the information on magnetic tape or on a hard drive stored in a safe. Cold storage turns the information security problem into a physical security problem. The catch comes when you need to use this information regularly, say to issue bank cards. Now you need protocols for regularly circumventing that physical security and correctly using/distributing the information, making it in essence an information security problem again.
- adrianN 6y agoA QR code on paper has the benefit that it lasts centuries
- michaelmior 6y agoIt depends on what kinds of attacks you're worried about. One of the challenges with paper is that someone can take a photograph of the data and steal it without the physical secret ever leaving trusted hands.
- ummonk 6y agoHow else would you store it? Printed is not vulnerable to electronic hacking, and encrypting it would be pointless since you’d also need to store the encryption key to the master encryption key then.