3 ms·
Presentations of Diffie-Helman leave out how to find g
- HelloNurse 6y agoMultiple reasons: - the challenging part of the protocol (from a security point of view) is agreeing on p and g, not finding them - the interesting part of the protocol is doing interesting things with p and g, not computing them by trial and error - there are solid and obvious guarantees that p and g exist and are easy to find, no reason to waste even half a paragraph
- alasdair_ 6y agoFormatting like this makes what you posted unreadable on mobile.
- cryptonector 6y agoYou have to remember to wrap text when you indent it by two or more spaces on HN.
- pimlottc 6y agoManual line wrapping is still not a very good solution since screen widths vary wildly.
- cryptonector 6y agoIt's the only option HN gives us. Blame HN.
- spekcular 6y agoI agree with the author and ran into the same problem when learning (and later teaching) D–H. A good explanation is given in the following crypto.stackexhcange answer; the last two paragraphs in particular are the short version: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/829 https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/829.
- cryptonector 6y agoThat says | There is no security issue with Diffie-Hellman (or DSA) if you reuse previously generated p, q and g; ... That's... not entirely true. For small enough p an attacker can mount a precomputation attack against the group. That's something the NSA is rumored to have done for standard (now obsolete) 512-bit DH groups. For large enough primes p this is not really a concern though, so, yeah. Also, DH is pretty much obsolete now with ECDH.
- spekcular 6y agoYes, I totally agree. The qualifier "for large enough p" should be added. For anyone reading this who's wondering about the NSA attack, some details can be found here: https://weakdh.org/ https://weakdh.org/. Circumstantial evidence that the NSA did what that website describes is given in the research paper there.
- ThePowerOfFuet 6y agoThis site is totally unreadable on mobile.