> If we trust DNS to publish the SNI public keys, why don't we trust it for the website certificate in the first place? These are two very different things. Th

> If we trust DNS to publish the SNI public keys, why don't we trust it for the website certificate in the first place? These are two very different things. The SNI public keys are only used to encrypt the hostname, i.e. the goal here is hostname privacy. You can't have hostname privacy without trusting the DNS. But it will always be a weak form of privacy, because you have to trust a third party. So what is happening here is that we say "ok, we can't have perfect hostname privacy, but allowing the DNS server to compromise our privacy is better than allowing it to everyone". Now if you put the cert there you'd say "we allow the DNS to compromise all of our TLS". You really don't want that. As multiple people here have said there's a way to put signed certificates into DNS called DANE. But it suffers from the fact that it relies on DNSSEC, which is a complex beast and probably most relevant: Which in the decades it has existed hasn't managed to get any relevant traction.