4 ms·
You're right, I completely spaced about DANE. My idea for letting the trust being tied to the Root and TLD master keys was more in spirit of allowing people to
by therealEleix 6y ago
You're right, I completely spaced about DANE.
My idea for letting the trust being tied to the Root and TLD master keys was more in spirit of allowing people to have more say in SSL. The Internet is technically centralized to the IP and DNS namespace already so for me it seemed like the next step in the chain. While we centralize one part of the Internet we also open it up to allow for alternative root projects like OpenNIC to be able to establish community-based chains of trust.
Like I know one of the big problems with OpenNIC is nobody can really use SSL since if you trust a third party CA they can just sign for anybody without limits, and if you run both a DNS and CA service there then you have everything you would need to do large scale SSL interception in those cases :(
- foxcpp 6y ago>if you trust a third party CA they can just sign for anybody without limits It is possible for a root certificate to have a name constraint making all certificates issued for other e.g. TLDs invalid. Like it is done in dn42 CA.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- detaro 6y agoYes, that's the nicer solution, and it seems Apple finally got around to adding support for it as well a while back - for a long time they didn't support it, so name constraints broke validation for Safari and Chrome on macOS.
- foxcpp 6y agoYour suggestion is to tie everything to the ownership of alternative root KSK. Meaning that you are explicitly blocking the possibility of multiple CAs for the project.