This is interesting. Wittgenstein argues that this idea of 'tacit knowledge' has no meaning. What the article describes is practice. 'My point is that their ex

This is interesting. Wittgenstein argues that this idea of 'tacit knowledge' has no meaning. What the article describes is practice. 'My point is that their explanations would not lead me to the same ability that they had.' is a very Wittgensteinian thing to say. See i.e. the parable of the wayward pupil in the Investigations on what role understanding/practice even play in the context of a statement like 'would not lead me to the same ability that they had' 'But the more I pushed, the more exceptions and caveats and potential gotchas I unearthed.' W argues that this is a result of our concept of what it means to understand. Can you name an idea where this doesn't hold? W uses a great example of your knowledge of the Natural Numbers. Just because you hadn't thought of the number 10324 beforehand, does that mean your knowledge didn't encompass it? Before you attempt to foist the problem onto mathematical logic (it doesn't work, but the answers become longer than an HN comment) consider your concept of the color 'red'. What shape is it? Did you a prior have in your mind the shape of red? Is there a color that I could show you which you might consider red and someone else would not? The core problem is this idea that 'explanations' in the source are implicitly able to be fully specified or that any knowledge exists without practice. See i.e. W's theory of language for a mind blowing explanation. I think the real question I would pose to the author is, what knowledge do you think qualifies as 'explicit'? I think you will find your answers supremely unsatisfying. If you don't, try Kripke's 'Wittgenstein's Paradox' and Goldfarb's (admittedly much more dense) 'Rule Following'