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> You added a very specific phrase outside of the definition though, with no justification: "that grounds moral responsibility". That both implicitly implies mo
by naasking 6y ago
> You added a very specific phrase outside of the definition though, with no justification: "that grounds moral responsibility". That both implicitly implies moral responsibility, and also claims that it is grounded by this particular definition of free will. I'd be interested in how you got to those conclusions.
I always qualify my use of free will as being specific to the philosophical use in ethics because there's so much conflation around the term [1]. I hold that the term "free will" as used in various contexts are not necessarily the same, and that conflating them or trying to define a more general notion of free will that encompasses them all obscures more than it helps.
Per [2], I then conceive of free will in this context as "moral responsibility as accountability". I am not referring to free will as used in any other context, and I hope I've been strict about preserving that distinction.
> > Humans have the power to change the state/future of the universe and the universe is not "set" in any way
This definition compounds exactly the conflation that I think hurts progress in this debate. People often want more general abstractions to think about entire classes of problems rather than specific instances, but in this context, I think it obscures more than it clarifies.
> This feels a bit logically impossible to me, and it may also be something you don't agree with either, but it is still a definition that people use to mean free will, I have seen it way too often.
Compatibilism is necessarily compatible with determinism in which the universe is "set" in a specific way, that's the whole point. So I disagree with the definition. That said, just because it's "set" doesn't make it predictable, in which case it's outcome is not "set" in a way that can be known in advance.
So I would revise the clause "the universe is not 'set' in any way" to read, "the universe is not 'set' in a way that's relevant to responsibility", or something along those lines. But again, maybe you're thinking along more general lines that conflate the ethical properties with properties needed for other purposes (like an experimenters' freedom in science).
> Just because an idea invalidates many ones that were previously popular does not make it any less true/false, nor does it prevent it from establishing new and helpful ideas on top of it, even if they do not really exist currently.
I agree. I don't see anything in hard determinism which doesn't already have a satisfactory answer in Compatibilism though. The only quality which people seem to find appealing is a lack of blame, but as you later say, pseudo-blame will also likely be a feature of hard determinism in order to make it workable.
In the hundreds of debates I've had on this topic, pretty much the only reason people have used to justify hard determinism is that they don't think punishment is justified, and they see eliminating blame as a way to avoid punishment. This conflates justice with the simpler question of moral responsibility, and as a result, they erroneously believe that free will and Compatibilism necessarily entail punishment.
> Again, I'd love to hear the argument [refuting error theory] rather than a simple refutation, truly, in a non attacking or confrontational way.
Here's a rough summary of my thoughts when I first read it:
1. The Argument from Relativity: we're apparently not troubled at all by disagreement over natural facts (see: flat earthers), but disagreement over moral facts is somehow more problematic? We distinguish "fact" from "belief" for exactly this reason. I don't see any motivation for error theory here.
2. The Argument from Metaphysical Queerness, aka, moral properties are "qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe", aka are moral prescriptions categorical or hypothetical imperatives: this appears to be the most subtle and misunderstood part of error theory, so maybe I'll delve in deeper at some point.
3. The Argument from Epistemic Queerness, aka, we would need "some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else": the epistemic "strangeness" of moral properties partly follows from the strangeness of qualia. For instance, we have moral prescriptions around causing pain. I'm an eliminativist about qualia, so I think the apparent strangeness are cognitive tricks that we will unpack in time. The only other faculty needed is reason.
Bambrough addressed most of these [3] almost a decade before Mackie's paper on error theory. Bambrough's working example of a child undergoing surgery is precisely an example of a logical argument depending on qualia (epistemic queerness), to establish a moral fact. I'm sure Mackie would find that result very queer indeed!
Which isn't to say that error theory wasn't a valuable contribution, because it's absolutely true that most alleged moral prescriptions have been false. I simply don't think there's any conclusive reason to think they're all false, and per Bambrough, I think there are reasons to think we already know some moral facts.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23480626 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23480626
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#FreeWillMoraResp https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#FreeWillMoraRes...
[3] A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals - Bambrough (1969), https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/3etl9b/a_proof_of_the_objectivity_of_morals_bambrough/ https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/3etl9b/a_proof_...
- adjkant 6y agoA think we're getting to a stuck point here, but to wrap up some of my main qualms: 1. I feel like we keep talking in circles on the definitional aspect. I'm with you on the many definitions causing confusion and I would love to see expanded vocabulary around this. But you haven't said anything to convince me against the idea that all three have moral relevancy in various ways. 2. To be clear, I do not believe hard determinism needs any sort of pseudo-blame to be workable, at least how I understand you are using that term. The only thing needed is causality in order in order to find the ideal "organization" of the world to optimize for whatever factors are settled on by other parts of the argument. 3. I actually agree with you on the lack of convincing of 1 and 3 for error theory (slightly different reasons but details not needed), but the argument from queerness seems to fit quite well. I'm not sure what part you're claiming is misunderstood. 4. The mentioned "justifications" on hard determinism are going the wrong way logically - you don't decide if something is true by if you need it to make morals that look nice, you follow what is true and see the results, and only then can you "check your work" with a sanity test. You've seem to cut off your thoughts on determinism before ever getting to a point where it actually produced a full set of moral ideas to check in favor of compatabilism simply because it produced something that passed said check, but if the underlying principle is false that's simply a coincidental state. Obviously you've also personally eliminated error theory, which is the core of our disagreement. As to justice, I fully agree on that being way oversimplified. For context, looking ahead, my theories on morality out of error theory basically lead to a consequentialist version of Rawls, so that's about where I stand re justice, with some nuance. > I think there are reasons to think we already know some moral facts. Can you give examples? Single or multiple, whatever you think is more useful in this context. I don't see how we get to moral facts without them being tied back subjectively to humans, which either invalidates the objectivism tract (now we're back at arguing metaethics fully) or you'd have to get there from the error theory route I've been talking about. To Bambrough's child surgery example, I think that only shows that that moral fact is true only subjectively to humans - it's not an "objective" moral truth. It is derived from the traits of a human, and the example generally works because it takes a clear cut case we can all agree on. All of this reasoning is still useful to an error theorist, but it is laid on the groundwork that morality is subjective to the state of humans/beings. If you mean to say that this is objective, then there is basically infinite moral facts in existence, we just debate them because humans and society are complex. That is to me the precise meaning of that "optimal organization" I reference, which is essentially that collection of all true moral facts, which I would argue are always subjective to the deterministic state of the world. Change anything about the world, and you likely change ethics itself. The argument from queerness highlights that without our perspective and values, objective morality wouldn't exist at all. I suspect definition will be the issue here again - are "moral facts" derived from the combination of human traits and our perspective considered objective or subjective? To me, that is subjective and then the combinations of subjectiveness along with the lack of inherent meaning or value produces a single objective level practical morality. I can understand the argument to classify that set of things itself as objective morality, but I think that weakens the base of the argument needlessly.