6 ms·
All I would like is an unencrypted version of QUIC for low overhead stuff where privacy/security isn't a concern such as experimental, CAN, or air-gapped networ
by exabrial 6y ago
All I would like is an unencrypted version of QUIC for low overhead stuff where privacy/security isn't a concern such as experimental, CAN, or air-gapped networks. This has been staunchly rejected unfortunately :/
- michaelbuckbee 6y agoI'd like that too, but I think we've all also seen when there's an "easy" workaround it's too often neglected. I'm hopeful that the hard _requirement_ to have encryption will force better management and security.
- bawolff 6y agoThere are reasons for that beyond crypto-everywhere-goodness - in the main use case crypto helps prevent middleboxes from messing with things which is critical for its success.
- DaiPlusPlus 6y agoFunny that - I thought the advantage of unencrypted HTTP was so that middleboxes could do things like caching (squid, etc) and outbound deep packet inspection to prevent information leaks in corporate environments.
- axaxs 6y agoMiddleboxes can still do that, assuming they have a valid SSL certificate. But that obviously makes it a -trusted- middlebox, not say, your ISPs middlebox.
- ta17711771 6y agoThat almost sounds like security.
- tialaramex 6y agoIf they actually do this correctly† then sure, you get security in the sense that you decided to trust My Corp Monkey Proxy to do whatever corporate monkeying, and nobody else can meddle with that. †The correct way to proxy HTTPS is wire a client and server with your meddling code in between, your client negotiates a TLS connection to say https://news.ycombinator.com/ https://news.ycombinator.com/ and it decides exactly what is sent and can see in plaintext exactly what's received. Users make TLS connections to your server and it presents them with a certificate it made, maybe claiming to be news.ycombinator.com and signed by My Corp Monkey Proxy then passes through some requests to the client we described. But it's much cheaper not to do this, and all of the other things you might do to achieve the same goal are insecure or break the protocol or both. So there's a big financial incentive to destroy security, while often ironically claiming to be improving security e.g. anti-phishing. For example choosing random number is hard yet at the same time essential for security - so several major vendors sold products that just didn't. When they turned A->B into A->M->B with their product as M, they'd just re-use the random numbers from the other conversation in the pair. This had been destroying security for all their customers for years, but we only found out they were doing it because it broke with TLS 1.3 final. Specifically when a TLS 1.3 server (but not draft versions for important compatibility reasons) talks to a client that doesn't agree to TLS 1.3 it scribbles the letters "DOWNGRD" over part of the random number field. Since the client supposedly doesn't know TLS 1.3 it shouldn't care, DOWNGRD is a ludicrously unlikely "random" choice but so is "FCKTRMP" or "KICKASS" and those don't mean anything in older TLS versions either. But if the client really does speak TLS 1.3 and has somehow been tricked into negotiating an old version, this weird choice of "random" number signals it's a trick and it will disconnect. The affected "proxies" would tell a nice shiny new Chrome or Firefox (which can speak TLS 1.3 and thus are looking out for DOWNGRD) that they only knew TLS 1.2, fair enough. And they'd tell servers, say www.google.com, the same thing. But the TLS 1.3 capable servers would scribble DOWNGRD into their random number field, and then because these "proxies" weren't actually assembled from a separate client and server but just re-used all the numbers, the DOWNGRD gets copied into data received in Chrome, and it disconnects because it has seemingly detected an active attack.
- axaxs 6y ago
- rakoo 6y agoBut then it's not a middlebox, because it is trusted by the server to act in its name.
- Sean-Der 6y agoHave you looked at SCTP over UDP at all? I use it for this and works great. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RNHkx_VvKWyWg6Lr8SZ-saqsQx7rFV-ev2jRFUoVD34/edit?pli=1#heading=h.nvk2biis6bpk https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RNHkx_VvKWyWg6Lr8SZ-saqs... actually compares them! If you don't care about initial startup time and FEC you might see zero difference.
- benlwalker 6y agoI think QUIC-the-transport is potentially an interesting transport for storage, but the data there is often already encrypted, so the double encryption is a waste. Is it possible to only encrypt the QUIC headers but leave the data unmodified? That idea just popped into my head and I'm not sure it makes any sense, but maybe that would provide the best of both worlds.
- fulafel 6y agoCrypto as a rule doesn't compose like that unfortunately. Replay attacks, etc.