3 ms·
You completely ignore the concept of data breaches and preventing them. You complain about the alleged problem, "man in the middle" technologies, without any pr
by unethical_ban 6y ago
You completely ignore the concept of data breaches and preventing them. You complain about the alleged problem, "man in the middle" technologies, without any proposed solution.
Let me be clear: If you do not think private companies and businesses have a right, and sometimes an obligation, to secure and monitor the traffic on their networks, then you are flat out incorrect, and this conversation can end.
If you agree they need to monitor data, but that MITM technologies are a societal risk more than a benefit, I am all ears. Host-based data scanning at an OS level; signed traffic that the network can trust has been scanned by authorized hosts (so rogue hosts don't send traffic out); and so on.
edit: I don't think your message is consistent, but I think that is not a sign of malice. You say "Companies have no legal or moral need to see what content is leaving their network" then say "You can block spam and outbound attacks without MITMing traffic."
You seem to be equating "See the content leaving their network" with "MITM", but then say later that companies can "prevent outbound attacks" without MITM. The #1 threat for many companies is data loss. How do you propose DLP gets accomplished with zero access to the network?
- kstrauser 6y agoYour employer provides you with a medical insurance plan. On your break at work, you use your company laptop to access the insurer's website and use their find-a-doctor tool to search for a cancer doctor. This is a legitimate use of your work computer, after all. Does your employer have a right and obligation to see that you're searching for a cancer doctor? Go to a large company's IT department and find the person there you dislike the most. Do you want that person monitoring the traffic and seeing that you searched for a cancer doctor? Now you know why so very many of us believe you are completely wrong about this.
- unethical_ban 6y agoDo you want your bank to be hacked and have a 50GB database backup with all your accounts and transaction history slow-leaked out via DNS queries? Now you see why so many of us believe you are completely wrong about this. To your point: If it is their network, it's their network and their computer. Access the website from home, or from your phone, which isn't MITM'ed on the corporate network. If it is a resource only available on the corporate network, but it is not a "company resource" such as find-a-doctor, then you can (a) accept that the company may see it, (b) contact information security and ask if they can, or (c) find another way to get the information/complain to HR/ombudsman/whatever. It is up to the company to do the right thing when possible, which means (in our case) we don't intercept websites categorized banking, health, and a handful of others. Information security obfuscates/blocks the showing of personally identifiable logs to the rest of IT, as well. Again, banks (in my example) have an obligation to their millions of customers to protect their data, more than you have a right to browse a doctor tool or upload sensitive spreadsheets to your personal Google Drive to work on over the weekend.
- droitbutch 6y ago> Does your employer have a right and obligation to see that you're searching for a cancer doctor? Do you have the right to prioritize your personal activities over your employers protection of its' data? Creating blindspots on enterprise networks won't get far - especially not given today's realities of breaches.
- Orphis 6y ago> Do you have the right to prioritize your personal activities over your employers protection of its' data? It is absolutely fine in many countries to use a work computer for light and occasional personal use or on breaks. And no, employers don't always have the right to monitor all traffic that isn't relevant to the business, or even files on your machine marked as personal. Really depends on the local laws though.
- JoshTriplett 6y ago> You complain about the alleged problem, "man in the middle" technologies, without any proposed solution. I don't have to provide a "proposed solution" to MITM; the proposed solution is "stop that". To the extent MITM is getting harder, that means network protocols and software is getting better. This is like asking the makers of adblockers what their "proposed solution" is for ads, or asking the makers of spam filters what their "proposed solution" is for sending spam. Most critically, in a standards body, the right answer to people trying to MITM is a polite and diplomatic version of "go away, your use case is invalid". > If you do not think private companies and businesses have a right, and sometimes an obligation, to secure and monitor the traffic on their networks They can certainly try (currently), and one of the jobs of security researchers is to ensure they fail enough that they stop trying. I also hope one day that there's enough collective bargaining power among engineers that such companies cannot successfully hire people, and that nobody ever has to be desperate enough to accept such a draconian network. I'm glad I'm in a position to be able to say I'll never work for a company that requires MITM; everyone should be able to avoid that. And the only time I'm aware of a company having an obligation is due to misguided regulations on certain narrow classes of businesses. > MITM technologies are a societal risk more than a benefit The company is the only one who could possibly benefit, and that's leaving aside the likely possibility of doing more harm than good; security measures work better when your users want to help you rather than thwart you. Meanwhile, the societal harm of ever allowing MITM is massive. Right now, the biggest step I'd love to see happen is browsers (in concert) having a persistent banner for "your traffic is being MITMed" any time they're getting the wrong certificate for sites, and browsers making that impossible to remove without rebuilding the browser from source (which is a substantial barrier). Next, we can make it easy for sites to detect access from MITMed networks, and make policy decisions on that basis. Then, coalitions of sites can collectively make it expensive to MITM. Put that together with new protocols that are increasingly desirable, and increasingly unavoidable, and which users will want, and you have a recipe for substantially reducing the number of companies willing to even try to MITM. > then say "You can block spam and outbound attacks without MITMing traffic." "We block outbound email ports" is not an unreasonable policy, as an example. And if someone tunnels around that, now they're spamming from their network, not yours, so it's not your fault. > How do you propose DLP gets accomplished with zero access to the network? "DLP" has become equated with "MITM". But you could, instead, focus on access to the data rather than interception of exfiltration. If people are trying to exfiltrate your data, they will find a way, very very easily. And there are much better ways to catch accidents. Also, most companies are still at the level of avoiding headlines like "laptop stolen with our whole database on it", which has nothing to do with MITM.