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We have actual security proofs for TLS 1.3 (which is the only version offered in QUIC) Of course such proofs come with caveats - in particular the proofs assum
by tialaramex 6y ago
We have actual security proofs for TLS 1.3 (which is the only version offered in QUIC)
Of course such proofs come with caveats - in particular the proofs assume your cryptographic primitives work as intended (e.g. that AES isn't broken) and that you've implemented the specification and not something else - but our experience has been that it's valuable to get those proofs, and where proof turns out to be difficult it's a valuable pointer to weaknesses in your design.
As far as I know nobody has done such a proof for the Noise design, and so we only have our intuition that it looks safe.
- luizfelberti 6y agoAFAIK Noise has end-to-end proofs of correctness using CryptoVerif, the work having mostly been done by the Prosecco team at INRIA. You can explore Noise protocols on NoiseExplorer [0][1] Also I may be wrong again, but it is for TLS, that even with all the simplifications and major changes on TLS 1.3, that we only have proofs of correctness for certain subsets of the spec, and specific modes of operation (theres a version of the protocol targeting IoT for which this work has been done, but I can't remember the name) [0] https://noiseexplorer.com/ https://noiseexplorer.com/ [1] https://rwc.iacr.org/2019/slides/NoiseExplorer.pdf https://rwc.iacr.org/2019/slides/NoiseExplorer.pdf
- baby 6y agoNot sure why you are getting downvoted because what you say is true.
- baby 6y agoIt’s actually the other way around. There are no up-to-date and complete proofs of tls, but there are several proofs for noise.