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> Morals can still exist without the principle of free will Not really, because you've just done away with moral blame. If there can be no moral blame, then th
by naasking 6y ago
> Morals can still exist without the principle of free will
Not really, because you've just done away with moral blame. If there can be no moral blame, then the moral classification of actions has no meaning.
- adjkant 6y agoThis is only true if you ground morality in objectivism and objective meaning, and require all useful conceptions of morality to fit that. What you have highlighted is that the meta-ethical view of objectivism is not compatible with determinism. Subjectivisms (both individualist and things like cultural relativism) and error theory are perfectly compatible with determinism. I personally ascribe to and argue for error theory which essentially leads to moral psychology actually dictating what ethics are. Based on that, it's quite easy to get to "murder is bad" via human traits like empathy and our social nature.
- ntsplnkv2 6y agoEthics are already predetermined, though. There is no need for error theory or any moral or ethical theory in a predetermined world - none of it matters. Arguments for determinism always have these "answers" to morality, but the only convincing one is moral nihilism.
- adjkant 6y ago> Ethics are already predetermined, though. No argument here, but knowing them still seems useful to humans. So in relation to humans, those terms and ideas are 100% needed. You're taking moral nihilism and jumping straight to general nihilism without any steps. > Arguments for determinism always have these "answers" to morality, but the only convincing one is moral nihilism. Error theory is a form of moral nihilism - what are you exactly disagreeing with here? ------------------------------------------------------ The bigger question is where you go from that moral nihilism. There is nothing that says just because our formal definitions of morality are false that the entire world doesn't matter. I still care for my happiness and life. So do many others. We need both this idea and these further terms and ideas in order to be able to answer the questions we were originally attempting to answer with objective morality because those problems did not magically go away.
- tsegratis 6y agoThanks for your clear distinctions. But still I don't understand Caring about happiness and life, to the point they have value is objective Do you have any other way to distinguish between moral and general nihilism? -- surely such a thing would need to be objective But you make a good point in that if there is no objective morality, there may still be some other way to make a value statement. But how could such a thing give value to moral nihilism, and still maintain the nihilism?? To be honest, I don't understand these HN comments any better than the original article -- but I do greatly appreciate them for their importance
- dkn775 6y agoFor me I think that value arises in a nihilistic world when regardless of what individuals actually do, over time we move further into chaotic outcomes, or that things gradually get more harmonious (less conflict and negative externalities). The latter comes from the realization that some things (ie actions based only on gaining money/power/fame, knowingly taking advantage of people, needlessly killing, laziness, cheating for gain, not helping the poor, not forgiving people). This arises from nihilism because some believe that it can't be possible that nothing matters when these values are "beyond our earthly realm" in that it often requires seeing things on a more spiritual level, and thinking beyond immediate gratification. It is then that one may see nihilistic people as those feeding their temptations as these are often the easiest things to do (running vs. sitting and getting fat). So while one can think nothing matters, some may then see that indeed some actions "retard" not just ourselves but all, and others are a net benefit for society. Though believing that such actions are actually a net benefit may be considered "faith" because I can't know for sure. Just my thoughts.
- tsegratis 6y agoThanks @dkn775 Yeah, to accept nihilism seems very destructive. Ultimately, to me, like you; it seems to equate to accepting zero value for others and ourselves Yet life burns to exist. We are desperate to live and to have meaning. It is no proof, but every fiber of our being cries out for a value beyond zero > Though believing that such actions are actually a net benefit may be considered "faith" because I can't know for sure. Nice. Personally, and from personal experience, I would base "faith" on concrete facts, and this provides a safe foundation for logic, etc -- I think you can know for sure Thanks for sharing
- naasking 6y ago> What you have highlighted is that the meta-ethical view of objectivism is not compatible with determinism. I don't see how that follows. Compatibilism is perfectly compatible with moral realism.
- adjkant 6y agoI should clarify, hard determinism.
- naasking 6y agoYes, hard determinism is very problematic, and this thread covers some of the reasons. I'm not sure every conception of moral realism is incompatible with hard determinism, but I haven't given it much thought as I don't see much redeeming value in hard determinism. As a hard determinist, you'll have to re-invent concepts of pseudo-moral blame in order to justify rehabilitation for those who break the law rather than simply changing the law itself to accomodate rule breakers, at which point you've just reinvented free will and called it something else. Moral error theory has problems of its own, so I don't think these all hang together very nicely.
- adjkant 6y agoFirst, to answer your definitions ask in the other thread. "Practical" free will, as described by both of us: > When people say that free will exists, they're saying that there is coherent notion of control over one's actions > When humans say "free will", they are referring IMO in actuality to a real thing - a combination of many things, but basically agency + lack of prediction powers You added a very specific phrase outside of the definition though, with no justification: "that grounds moral responsibility". That both implicitly implies moral responsibility, and also claims that it is grounded by this particular definition of free will. I'd be interested in how you got to those conclusions. The "stricter/formal/whatever label you add here" version, that some try to argue for, including some compatibilists, goes more or less like this: > Humans have the power to change the state/future of the universe and the universe is not "set" in any way This feels a bit logically impossible to me, and it may also be something you don't agree with either, but it is still a definition that people use to mean free will, I have seen it way too often. However, the lack of this type of thing still has meaning is what I am trying to say. It is what leads to error theory for me, and then effectively what leads away from it. I wonder if that "away from" part might also solve some of your qualms with error theory. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In terms of hard determinism, it seems to me you only listed off reasons that hard determinism doesn't sound easy, but made no argument against it itself. Just because an idea invalidates many ones that were previously popular does not make it any less true/false, nor does it prevent it from establishing new and helpful ideas on top of it, even if they do not really exist currently. > you'll have to re-invent concepts of pseudo-moral blame This is exactly where I think hard determinism has its value. There is no moral blame - hard determinism requires a morality without it, and that's okay. It simply is new because people have focused so hard on blame, but I think that "formal" definition of free will is useful to show precisely that blame is not in play. > at which point you've just reinvented free will and called it something else I do think much of this will happen, but the distinction between the definitions has consequences. I already argued about for blame, but I think there is much more to explore there. > Moral error theory has problems of its own, so I don't think these all hang together very nicely. Again, I'd love to hear the argument rather than a simple refutation, truly, in a non attacking or confrontational way. At this point I think the HN format is hurting more than it's helping, so if you're interested in talking more feel free to shoot me an email, @gmail.com. You seem well versed in this area and I've love to hear more details on your perspective and reasoning/principles.
- Fricken 6y agoIf, say, a boulder is rolling down a hill towards my home, I don't need to assign any sense of will or blame to the boulder to know that it's dangerous or to want to stop it. As social animals, we have an intrinsic interest in preserving social harmony, in as much as the reproductive success of any individual is contingent on the success of the group as a whole. Morality is just the game theory element of this being played out. I could make reasoned moral arguments on behalf of the well being of chickens or why we shouldn't destroy the planet, and you may nod and agree, but without a strong emotional impulse to attach to these moral causes, it's hard to get people to take these things very seriously. It's too much of an abstraction.
- naasking 6y ago> As social animals, we have an intrinsic interest in preserving social harmony, in as much as the reproductive success of any individual is contingent on the success of the group as a whole. Morality is just the game theory element of this being played out. In other words, you acknowledge that you have no moral justification for assigning blame, you simply do it out of convenience. That's weak sauce IMO. Giving up cognitivism and moral realism is very problematic on multiple levels, and your response hand waves away these other problems IMO [1]. You just end up reinventing free will and calling it something different. For people that accept that moral propositions actually have truth values (most people), assigning blame requires free will, and ultimately, we end up in the same place anyway, just with a bunch more people being confused about why we have new jargon that serves the exact same function as the old jargon. [1] Edit: for instance, life no longer has any intrinsic value, so you can justify all sorts of morally repugnant conclusions, like that totalitarian regimes are justifiable, or that a government should only care about the death rate of its citizens in order to keep it low enough to prevent widespread revolt.
- Fricken 6y agoAssigning blame requires only the impulse to assign blame, which is derived from a very primitive impulse to neutralize a threat, be it a tiger, or a thief, or whatever. The whole notion of free will is a cultural construct. There are societies that have no perception of it, they believe that their actions are guided by spirits. Western concepts of justice are founded on the idea of free will, so of course you need it for western rationalizations of how to apply justice, but arguing that we need free will for justice to work is putting the cart before the horse. We just need it for our version of justice. My cat doesn't need it to take a swipe at the dog when it goes for the cat's food. It is in my interest to argue that life has intrinsic value because if I don't I risk being considered a threat by people who happen to value their own lives quite a bit. It's just simple game theory. I don't see how free will, either real or imagined, is necessary to value the lives of others. And of course, there are no consequences for killing a chicken, so there are no strong moral impulses against it. By our own rationalizations, life doesn't have any intrinsic value unless it is a life that serves us, or has power over us, and the value of a chicken's life extends only as far as it is tasty to us.
- MaxBarraclough 6y ago> If there can be no moral blame, then the moral classification of actions has no meaning. At the risk of mirroring Fricken's reply, this isn't so. Suppose a brain tumour drives someone to commit murder, as may have been the case with Charles Whitman. The act remains morally atrocious even if the individual's culpability is doubtful. Same goes for a killer animal, or natural disaster, or even disease. Moral blame is discounted entirely in pure utilitarianism (which is of course deeply flawed, but I think it's still illustrative here).
- naasking 6y ago> The act remains morally atrocious even if the individual's culpability is doubtful. And why is his culpability doubtful? I think you'll find his lack of free will implicit in your argument.