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There is no world where you just get to tamper with stuff. In the absence of trusted computing, the anti-tamper strategy is server-side policy logic and central
by closeparen 6y ago
There is no world where you just get to tamper with stuff. In the absence of trusted computing, the anti-tamper strategy is server-side policy logic and central databases.
The ability to control and trust devices that have left the issuer's physical possession enables decentralized and privacy-preserving architectures.
If this tech were perfect (it isn't) you could even do a peer to peer cryptocurrency without proof of work. Just make your peers prove they are running software which will refuse to double-spend.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- CamperBob2 6y agoThe ability to control and trust devices that have left the issuer's physical possession enables decentralized and privacy-preserving architectures. One question: who, exactly, is this "issuer" you're referring to? Me? The people who sold me the computer? The people who manufactured the computer? The people who wrote the CPU microcode that I don't have access to? The government agencies they may or may not answer to? Just make your peers prove they are running software which will refuse to double-spend. OK, make that two questions: how is this not equivalent to solving the Halting Problem? There is no world where you just get to tamper with stuff. There is, if it's my stuff.
- closeparen 6y agoIf it's your stuff, then you control whether remote attestations are required and what checksums / signatures are considered valid.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- CamperBob2 6y agoSo, no answer to the actual questions, it sounds like. Got it.