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You're right, and the idea of a secure enclave is not an inherently bad one. What is bad is treating it as an unassailable fortress, as in signal's address boo
by mmm_grayons 6y ago
You're right, and the idea of a secure enclave is not an inherently bad one. What is bad is treating it as an unassailable fortress, as in signal's address book feature. There's a difference between using it to make critical parts of existing computations more secure and using it to do stuff one wouldn't otherwise do.
- dane-pgp 6y ago> You're right, and the idea of a secure enclave is not an inherently bad one. Maybe it is when you're trusting private keys and proprietary technology controlled by a single entity that may be subject to commercial and political pressures that make their motives not aligned to yours.
- anonymousDan 6y agoI hope you're not typing that on an Intel processor :)
- dane-pgp 6y ago$ grep vendor_id /proc/cpuinfo vendor_id : AuthenticAMD
- AlexCoventry 6y ago> What is bad is treating it as an unassailable fortress It's also a pretty bad architecture/design failure, for a TEE to share computational resources with untrusted processes. I heard the decision to do so at Intel was due to marketing considerations outweighing the security concerns: Customers didn't want computational resources going fallow for the sake of security. I'm skeptical about whether a truly trustworthy TEE is possible, but it seems even less likely, given SGX's architecture.