5 ms·

I'm not entirely against the concept of trusted computing, but it's hard to believe that "trusted computing" as we know it today is so innocuous when it's inclu

I'm not entirely against the concept of trusted computing, but it's hard to believe that "trusted computing" as we know it today is so innocuous when it's included on consumer CPUs. Why not keep it as a premium feature for server-class CPUs instead?

uluyol 6y ago
I don't think SGX is available on any consumer CPUs.
- akersten 6y ago
  It has been part of the architecture since Skylake: > Most Desktop, Mobile (6th generation Core and up) and low-end Server processors (Xeon E3 v5 and up) released since Fall 2015 support SGX.[0] [0]: https://fortanix.com/intel-sgx/ https://fortanix.com/intel-sgx/
- matheusmoreira 6y ago
  My laptop has an Intel i7-8750H CPU. https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/products/134906/intel-core-i7-8750h-processor-9m-cache-up-to-4-10-ghz.html https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/products/134906/... > Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) > Yes with Intel® ME I have it disabled in the firmware settings.
anonymousDan 6y ago
I believe it has actually been deprecated for consumer CPUs.
lxgr 6y ago
Remote attestation can be incredibly useful and mutually beneficial on client devices as well if you're willing to consider applications beyond DRM. For example, every smartcard is essentially a device in your physical possession, running somebody else's code. I'd argue that for example in the case of EMV payment cards, the benefit is mutual (less fraud). Android supports a variant of this for generic secure transaction confirmation: https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/android-protected-confirmation.html https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/android-pr...
- akersten 6y ago
  I'm comfortable with it on SmartCards or EMV chips, since those are tailored devices for a specific purpose and the trust model is understood by the participants. I'm not particularly upset that I can't root my credit card. Mobile phones, it's disappointing, but total consumer control was kind of a lost cause from day 1. What truly bothers me is the introduction of trusted computing into general-purpose consumer CPUs, where previously we had complete freedom. There's an old but still very good CCC talk that encapsulates my feelings about this [0]. [0]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg
  - lxgr 6y ago
    Just to better understand your line of reasoning: Do you generally equate trusted computing with elevated privileges for the attestable code being executed? I think this is where a lot of trust (on a meta-level) in the technology has been lost, and as far as I understand it, modern implementations are, on the contrary, tightly sandboxed. In that sense, modern trusted computing can actually be more freedom preserving: If you are generally willing to tolerate DRM on your system, as long as it's not able to access data on your computer that are none of its business, you're more likely to see that happen on a modern, hardware-assisted DRM platform than on the rootkit based software shenanigans of the early 2000s.
    - akersten 6y ago
      Elevated privileges for a hardware blob is an even worse situation that unfortunately exists (Intel ME/AMD PSP). For me the issue is the blob itself. "Trusted" for the manufacturer is "trust us" for the end-user. My expectation for a general-purpose CPU is that I can inspect the code that's running on it. Building a TPM into consumer CPUs defies that freedom. So, it's about hackability (in the Hacker News sense). If you can't see what's happening inside of your computer, is it really yours?
  - kohtatsu 6y ago
    Non-Google link: https://media.ccc.de/v/28c3-4848-en-the_coming_war_on_general_computation https://media.ccc.de/v/28c3-4848-en-the_coming_war_on_genera...

uluyol 6y ago

I don't think SGX is available on any consumer CPUs.

akersten 6y ago
It has been part of the architecture since Skylake: > Most Desktop, Mobile (6th generation Core and up) and low-end Server processors (Xeon E3 v5 and up) released since Fall 2015 support SGX.[0] [0]: https://fortanix.com/intel-sgx/ https://fortanix.com/intel-sgx/
matheusmoreira 6y ago
My laptop has an Intel i7-8750H CPU. https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/products/134906/intel-core-i7-8750h-processor-9m-cache-up-to-4-10-ghz.html https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/products/134906/... > Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) > Yes with Intel® ME I have it disabled in the firmware settings.

anonymousDan 6y ago

I believe it has actually been deprecated for consumer CPUs.

lxgr 6y ago

Remote attestation can be incredibly useful and mutually beneficial on client devices as well if you're willing to consider applications beyond DRM. For example, every smartcard is essentially a device in your physical possession, running somebody else's code. I'd argue that for example in the case of EMV payment cards, the benefit is mutual (less fraud). Android supports a variant of this for generic secure transaction confirmation: https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/android-protected-confirmation.html https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/android-pr...

akersten 6y ago
I'm comfortable with it on SmartCards or EMV chips, since those are tailored devices for a specific purpose and the trust model is understood by the participants. I'm not particularly upset that I can't root my credit card. Mobile phones, it's disappointing, but total consumer control was kind of a lost cause from day 1. What truly bothers me is the introduction of trusted computing into general-purpose consumer CPUs, where previously we had complete freedom. There's an old but still very good CCC talk that encapsulates my feelings about this [0]. [0]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg
- lxgr 6y ago
  Just to better understand your line of reasoning: Do you generally equate trusted computing with elevated privileges for the attestable code being executed? I think this is where a lot of trust (on a meta-level) in the technology has been lost, and as far as I understand it, modern implementations are, on the contrary, tightly sandboxed. In that sense, modern trusted computing can actually be more freedom preserving: If you are generally willing to tolerate DRM on your system, as long as it's not able to access data on your computer that are none of its business, you're more likely to see that happen on a modern, hardware-assisted DRM platform than on the rootkit based software shenanigans of the early 2000s.
  - akersten 6y ago
    Elevated privileges for a hardware blob is an even worse situation that unfortunately exists (Intel ME/AMD PSP). For me the issue is the blob itself. "Trusted" for the manufacturer is "trust us" for the end-user. My expectation for a general-purpose CPU is that I can inspect the code that's running on it. Building a TPM into consumer CPUs defies that freedom. So, it's about hackability (in the Hacker News sense). If you can't see what's happening inside of your computer, is it really yours?
- kohtatsu 6y ago
  Non-Google link: https://media.ccc.de/v/28c3-4848-en-the_coming_war_on_general_computation https://media.ccc.de/v/28c3-4848-en-the_coming_war_on_genera...