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I don't get his point. After all there is no need for a conscious introspection from evolutionary perspective - not even for pain. There is observable behavio

I don't get his point. After all there is no need for a conscious introspection from evolutionary perspective - not even for pain. There is observable behaviour driven by events from the "outside" world. That all could easily be represented by a function of some input. No qualia needed. The truth behind this is that science has no grip on certain things. And these things are the central aspects of human experience. So all science can do is explaining consciousness "away". Like Dennet (among others) does. Magicans that distract and redirect the focus away from the matter. It could be just an epiphenomenon.

Reelin 6y ago
You seem to be describing p-zombies which (IMO) don't have much overlap with present day science. Higher level reasoning would appear to increase fitness in many cases. For whatever reason, our version of it appears to involve conscious introspection. As to the point of the article - it's about modeling human learning as a reinforcement learning problem and thus pain as one of many interacting loss functions. In particular it's about modeling how these different loss functions interact with one another to achieve a desirable outcome.
- DrLindemann 6y ago
  I just cannot see why the introspection is needed and to what regard it extends the functional paradigma. For the outcome of reaction - there is no introspection needed. The difference between a pain value and qualia of pain is not clear with regard to the function of behaviour and evolution. Qualia is not simply a state. a state can also be modelled with a function. The examples with people deactivating the "warning prothetics" are no real explanation. I think a (non conscious but complex)function or set of functions could simulate human behaviour without introspection or conscious sense. There is, from evolutionary perspective, no necessity for it. Don't get me wrong, I appreciate the authors work. I maybe just missed where the magic begins.
  - Reelin 6y ago
    Certainly we lack (to the best of my knowledge) a rigorous model or definition for terms such as "conscious" and "qualia". That doesn't tell us anything about whether introspection or consciousness is necessary or not, just that our understanding is lacking. The fact that humans seem to have it doesn't say anything about it's necessity (or lack thereof). It only speaks to it's presence in our particular case. I would challenge your assertion that "qualia is not simply a state". In the absence of a rigorous model how are you backing such a claim? Similarly, how are you justifying your assertion that human behavior could be simulated without introspection or consciousness? For that matter, how could anyone justify a claim to the contrary? It seems to me that (at present) we simply lack the knowledge to meaningfully reason about generalizations such as introspection or consciousness being necessary or not. As to why the author brings qualia in to it - my guess would simply be "because humans seem to have it". Sure, you could write about bi-level loss functions from a purely mathematical standpoint. The point (IMO) is to tie that mathematical model back to a concrete example in the real world in order to draw inspiration for the design of more capable RL algorithms. It occurs to me that you might be interested in this recent essay on the topic. (https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/06/01/book-review-origin-of-consciousness-in-the-breakdown-of-the-bicameral-mind/ https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/06/01/book-review-origin-of-...)
    - DrLindemann 6y ago
      > Certainly we lack (to the best of my knowledge) a rigorous model or definition for terms such as "conscious" and "qualia". That doesn't tell us anything about whether introspection or consciousness is necessary or not, just that our understanding is lacking. Yes. In (theoretical) Computer Science, one of the first things students learn are the limits of their domain and the limits of mathematics and models in general. Keywords: Halting problem In other domains (e.g. biology, psychology etc.) they don't bother with such meta physics :) They use very primitive models (e.g. game theory) to map very complex processes. They forget the proverb that all models are wrong, but some are useful. And if that complexity gap is to big, the models just model randomness. Long story short: I doubt it is possible to build a formal model to describe qualia or introspection. > The fact that humans seem to have it doesn't say anything > about it's necessity (or lack thereof). > It only speaks to it's presence in our particular case. > I would challenge your assertion that "qualia is not simply a state". > In the absence of a rigorous model how are you backing such a claim? As I said, there is no "connection", no "dependency" to evolutionary processes. It is decoupled of what we call evolution. I would rather think it is a property of matter or physics, than one of biology or even cognition. On the other hand, take the usual examples. A color can be described as a certain wavelength. You can model that. You can build a machine, that detects / "percepts" colors and have an inner state of that "color". What is needed in addidition, to create, what we (as humans) perveive as colors? Is it a matter of complexity? Like, if a lot of processes interact and supervise each other, then there are 3rd level effects, like with magnetism and electricity. And one of this is a new emerging "force": consciousness. > Similarly, how are you justifying your assertion that > human behavior could be simulated without introspection > or consciousness? Maybe not in that complexity, but it's possible to simulate agents artificially in an artificial world. To simulate reality, you need a "super" reality and more energy than is existing. Modelling is costly. You have to sacrify through "abstraction". Maybe consciousness is just possible at this level of immediacy when everything interacts with everything in real time. > For that matter, how could anyone justify a claim > to the contrary? If it could model or emulate a certain mental state at any time of a given person and communicate that state. So that the person could verify it. Like a weather forecast. It would be a sign in the direction. But of cause a real "proof" is not possible.

Reelin 6y ago

You seem to be describing p-zombies which (IMO) don't have much overlap with present day science. Higher level reasoning would appear to increase fitness in many cases. For whatever reason, our version of it appears to involve conscious introspection. As to the point of the article - it's about modeling human learning as a reinforcement learning problem and thus pain as one of many interacting loss functions. In particular it's about modeling how these different loss functions interact with one another to achieve a desirable outcome.

DrLindemann 6y ago
I just cannot see why the introspection is needed and to what regard it extends the functional paradigma. For the outcome of reaction - there is no introspection needed. The difference between a pain value and qualia of pain is not clear with regard to the function of behaviour and evolution. Qualia is not simply a state. a state can also be modelled with a function. The examples with people deactivating the "warning prothetics" are no real explanation. I think a (non conscious but complex)function or set of functions could simulate human behaviour without introspection or conscious sense. There is, from evolutionary perspective, no necessity for it. Don't get me wrong, I appreciate the authors work. I maybe just missed where the magic begins.
- Reelin 6y ago
  Certainly we lack (to the best of my knowledge) a rigorous model or definition for terms such as "conscious" and "qualia". That doesn't tell us anything about whether introspection or consciousness is necessary or not, just that our understanding is lacking. The fact that humans seem to have it doesn't say anything about it's necessity (or lack thereof). It only speaks to it's presence in our particular case. I would challenge your assertion that "qualia is not simply a state". In the absence of a rigorous model how are you backing such a claim? Similarly, how are you justifying your assertion that human behavior could be simulated without introspection or consciousness? For that matter, how could anyone justify a claim to the contrary? It seems to me that (at present) we simply lack the knowledge to meaningfully reason about generalizations such as introspection or consciousness being necessary or not. As to why the author brings qualia in to it - my guess would simply be "because humans seem to have it". Sure, you could write about bi-level loss functions from a purely mathematical standpoint. The point (IMO) is to tie that mathematical model back to a concrete example in the real world in order to draw inspiration for the design of more capable RL algorithms. It occurs to me that you might be interested in this recent essay on the topic. (https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/06/01/book-review-origin-of-consciousness-in-the-breakdown-of-the-bicameral-mind/ https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/06/01/book-review-origin-of-...)
  - DrLindemann 6y ago
    > Certainly we lack (to the best of my knowledge) a rigorous model or definition for terms such as "conscious" and "qualia". That doesn't tell us anything about whether introspection or consciousness is necessary or not, just that our understanding is lacking. Yes. In (theoretical) Computer Science, one of the first things students learn are the limits of their domain and the limits of mathematics and models in general. Keywords: Halting problem In other domains (e.g. biology, psychology etc.) they don't bother with such meta physics :) They use very primitive models (e.g. game theory) to map very complex processes. They forget the proverb that all models are wrong, but some are useful. And if that complexity gap is to big, the models just model randomness. Long story short: I doubt it is possible to build a formal model to describe qualia or introspection. > The fact that humans seem to have it doesn't say anything > about it's necessity (or lack thereof). > It only speaks to it's presence in our particular case. > I would challenge your assertion that "qualia is not simply a state". > In the absence of a rigorous model how are you backing such a claim? As I said, there is no "connection", no "dependency" to evolutionary processes. It is decoupled of what we call evolution. I would rather think it is a property of matter or physics, than one of biology or even cognition. On the other hand, take the usual examples. A color can be described as a certain wavelength. You can model that. You can build a machine, that detects / "percepts" colors and have an inner state of that "color". What is needed in addidition, to create, what we (as humans) perveive as colors? Is it a matter of complexity? Like, if a lot of processes interact and supervise each other, then there are 3rd level effects, like with magnetism and electricity. And one of this is a new emerging "force": consciousness. > Similarly, how are you justifying your assertion that > human behavior could be simulated without introspection > or consciousness? Maybe not in that complexity, but it's possible to simulate agents artificially in an artificial world. To simulate reality, you need a "super" reality and more energy than is existing. Modelling is costly. You have to sacrify through "abstraction". Maybe consciousness is just possible at this level of immediacy when everything interacts with everything in real time. > For that matter, how could anyone justify a claim > to the contrary? If it could model or emulate a certain mental state at any time of a given person and communicate that state. So that the person could verify it. Like a weather forecast. It would be a sign in the direction. But of cause a real "proof" is not possible.