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I don't think it actually avoids those nasty security issues--just makes attacking them somewhat harder. Userspace still needs to read and write the call stack
by jcranmer 6y ago
I don't think it actually avoids those nasty security issues--just makes attacking them somewhat harder. Userspace still needs to read and write the call stack to support features such as debugging and unwind support, not to mention green threads, so you can probably still leverage existing libraries in malicious ways (à la return-oriented programming) to do the stack manipulation necessary to get you to return-oriented programming attacks.
- JoeAltmaier 6y agoThe call stack need only be inaccessible to normal data operations. If it is solely user-addressable with call and return instructions, the vulnerability is gone. That's kind of the whole point - call/return can be vastly more secure than 'part of a data space' as it is now. Benefits would accrue. And challenges.
- jcranmer 6y agoHow would you implement something like _Unwind_Resume, which requires returning to a different return address that's based on but not identical to the one on the stack?
- JoeAltmaier 6y agoNot an expert. Implemented as a hidden return value/switch at the appropriate point? Some features may be inherently dangerous and not supportable on a secure processor.