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>If Zoom provides end to end encryption to its paying customers, it still has to provide access to law enforcement to the content of those communications. How
by michaelmrose 6y ago
>If Zoom provides end to end encryption to its paying customers, it still has to provide access to law enforcement to the content of those communications.
How do you think this works? If Alice and Bob generate private keys and share only their public keys with each other over the wire how does the provider obtain the content of those communications to share? It never had them.
There is no non broken way to provide a backdoor for government while actually retaining meaningful security in the long run. See the extensive discussion on "key escrow"
Lets discuss a very old encrypted communication mechanism. PGP encrypted email. If I Bob send an encrypted email to Alice how does gmail fulfill its obligations as stated previously to law enforcement? PGP came out in 1991 and CALEA is from 1994. In the 26 years since I don't seem to recall anyone shutting down gmail.
- PeterStuer 6y ago"There is no non broken way to provide a backdoor for government while actually retaining meaningful security in the long run" I actually agree with you on this. I was personally involved in the past to advocate for stronger encryption ( https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/102497computing.html https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/we... [1997]). However, law enforcement agencies around the world see "broken" ways to achieve this as a 'lesser of two evils' trade-off. Am I too paranoid (I hope I am) to envisage a scenario where Sam, our friendly US law enforcement officer asks Sheila, his friendly AU counterpart to request a copy of the conversation obtained through technical capability and assistance notices and share it back under 5 eyes agreements? Add the pending bilateral CLOUD act for an extra spicy double exchange sandwich?