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Current encryption imementations (AES GCM) will not be downgraded. Meetings will still be encrypted and meeting content is still not going to be used for tracki

Current encryption imementations (AES GCM) will not be downgraded. Meetings will still be encrypted and meeting content is still not going to be used for tracking users. E2E will be an opt in choice for paying users who are willing to sacrifice some features for the benefits from additional security. See this thread for more details: https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/1268061790954385408 https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/1268061790954385408 Edit to credit vjeux for the thread link

bobbydroptables 6y ago
Do I have any way to verify this as a user?
- virtue3 6y ago
  as the colloquialism goes: Talk is cheap...
- dijksterhuis 6y ago
  Sure. Study a PhD in cryptanalysis and reverse engineering. If you want to look at something now, the white paper for the E2E protocol design is public and open right now: https://github.com/zoom/zoom-e2e-whitepaper https://github.com/zoom/zoom-e2e-whitepaper On a more serious note, until there is a protocol and implementation available then we can't say anything for sure. Us Security folks aren't magicians.
  - TheSpiceIsLife 6y ago
    I like your tone, and it lead me to think: Any sufficiently advanced cryptography is indistinguishable from magic. Which isn’t entirely untrue from a layperson’s perspective. Edit: fixed a word. I’d accidentally written “is” rather than “isn’t”.
    - randomsearch 6y ago
      Cryptography is a religion
  - manquer 6y ago
    That was uncalled for . Yes it is hard or impossible to do in zoom . If these tools use open standards and well documented protocols this will not be a problem. I can verify without a phd in cryptoanalyis and reverse engineering my browser is running a secure connection to a website and certificate is signed by the source(for sites enabled with FS and HSTS ).
    - kwanbix 6y ago
      Well, even if all of your software was open source, do you have the time to validate all of it, from the app to the OS? what about the CPU?
      - manquer 6y ago
        This is well known issue since Ken Thompson’s trusting trust paper and not what am I getting at it It is degrees of trust . Trust is not absolute , neither is security . Depending on your threat models you have to secure yourself. More transparency improves security does not solve all the problems just makes it costlier for an attacker . If cost outweighs the benefit they will not attempt to do it. Https does not magically make your communication 100% secure ,however the number of people who can issue a certificate from a comprised root CA or control one is considerably less than the number of people who can monitor your plain text traffic .
    - dijksterhuis 6y ago
      Don't get me started on browser certificates. That's a whole week of my life I'll never get back. The short versiom of it is, your browser trusts CAs to say whether a certificate is valid. But CAs often trust other CAs who may not actually be that trustworthy. Those CAs then trust other CAs who definitely are not as trustworthy... Etc. So that certificate/padlock picture in your browser may not be as trustworthy as you think. It's an active problem.
      - SXX 6y ago
        Mandatory Ceryificate Transparency is solve problem of trust to CAs quite well though.
- mrmonkeyman 6y ago
  Go open source.
monadic2 6y ago
How will you show this going forward?
- dijksterhuis 6y ago
  Reverse engineer/packet sniff the implementation and perform some sort of cryptanalysis to see if the implementation works according to the published protocol. It's pretty standard. That's sort of what happened with the ECB mode stuff that kicked this whole thing off in the first palace. See section 4 from the below for more info. https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto...
  - vertex-four 6y ago
    That doesn't show that someone on Zoom's end isn't decrypting data in an invisible way, without a warrant, with the key they have access to, in the non-e2e case.
    - dijksterhuis 6y ago
      This whole discussion is about the E2E case. That's what the CEO was referring to. There's a twitter thread link somewhere. I think I read that Zoom do decrypt AES-GCM server side already. They have to so they can put the little green box around the person currently speaking. EDIT - this is incorrect for AES-GCM, it's not decrypted server side. Edit - at least e2e is the angle I'm approaching it from as it's the new information.
      - vertex-four 6y ago
        This is what you said: > Meetings will still be encrypted and meeting content is still not going to be used for tracking users. And the person responding to you asked "how will you show this?".
        6y ago

bobbydroptables 6y ago

Do I have any way to verify this as a user?

virtue3 6y ago
as the colloquialism goes: Talk is cheap...
dijksterhuis 6y ago
Sure. Study a PhD in cryptanalysis and reverse engineering. If you want to look at something now, the white paper for the E2E protocol design is public and open right now: https://github.com/zoom/zoom-e2e-whitepaper https://github.com/zoom/zoom-e2e-whitepaper On a more serious note, until there is a protocol and implementation available then we can't say anything for sure. Us Security folks aren't magicians.
- TheSpiceIsLife 6y ago
  I like your tone, and it lead me to think: Any sufficiently advanced cryptography is indistinguishable from magic. Which isn’t entirely untrue from a layperson’s perspective. Edit: fixed a word. I’d accidentally written “is” rather than “isn’t”.
  - randomsearch 6y ago
    Cryptography is a religion
- manquer 6y ago
  That was uncalled for . Yes it is hard or impossible to do in zoom . If these tools use open standards and well documented protocols this will not be a problem. I can verify without a phd in cryptoanalyis and reverse engineering my browser is running a secure connection to a website and certificate is signed by the source(for sites enabled with FS and HSTS ).
  - kwanbix 6y ago
    Well, even if all of your software was open source, do you have the time to validate all of it, from the app to the OS? what about the CPU?
    - manquer 6y ago
      This is well known issue since Ken Thompson’s trusting trust paper and not what am I getting at it It is degrees of trust . Trust is not absolute , neither is security . Depending on your threat models you have to secure yourself. More transparency improves security does not solve all the problems just makes it costlier for an attacker . If cost outweighs the benefit they will not attempt to do it. Https does not magically make your communication 100% secure ,however the number of people who can issue a certificate from a comprised root CA or control one is considerably less than the number of people who can monitor your plain text traffic .
  - dijksterhuis 6y ago
    Don't get me started on browser certificates. That's a whole week of my life I'll never get back. The short versiom of it is, your browser trusts CAs to say whether a certificate is valid. But CAs often trust other CAs who may not actually be that trustworthy. Those CAs then trust other CAs who definitely are not as trustworthy... Etc. So that certificate/padlock picture in your browser may not be as trustworthy as you think. It's an active problem.
    - SXX 6y ago
      Mandatory Ceryificate Transparency is solve problem of trust to CAs quite well though.
mrmonkeyman 6y ago
Go open source.

monadic2 6y ago

How will you show this going forward?

dijksterhuis 6y ago
Reverse engineer/packet sniff the implementation and perform some sort of cryptanalysis to see if the implementation works according to the published protocol. It's pretty standard. That's sort of what happened with the ECB mode stuff that kicked this whole thing off in the first palace. See section 4 from the below for more info. https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto-a-quick-look-at-the-confidentiality-of-zoom-meetings/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/04/move-fast-roll-your-own-crypto...
- vertex-four 6y ago
  That doesn't show that someone on Zoom's end isn't decrypting data in an invisible way, without a warrant, with the key they have access to, in the non-e2e case.
  - dijksterhuis 6y ago
    This whole discussion is about the E2E case. That's what the CEO was referring to. There's a twitter thread link somewhere. I think I read that Zoom do decrypt AES-GCM server side already. They have to so they can put the little green box around the person currently speaking. EDIT - this is incorrect for AES-GCM, it's not decrypted server side. Edit - at least e2e is the angle I'm approaching it from as it's the new information.
    - vertex-four 6y ago
      This is what you said: > Meetings will still be encrypted and meeting content is still not going to be used for tracking users. And the person responding to you asked "how will you show this?".
      - 6y ago