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> With that kind of money they can pretty much bypass any measure an OS manufacturer could reasonably put in place Exactly. That's why this should just stop. B

by ebg13 6y ago

> With that kind of money they can pretty much bypass any measure an OS manufacturer could reasonably put in place Exactly. That's why this should just stop. Because it hurts without helping.

close04 6y ago
> That's why this should just stop So they should stop (discontinue) every measure that can be bypassed by an outfit with this kind of money? That doesn't leave many measures, if any. And it lowers the bar for a successful attack to someone with a couple of hours to spare. SmartScreen prompts are just like any HTTP error in a browser. The cert certifies an identity, that's it. It doesn't magically clean any malware inside, that you know the identity, or that you have to trust it. > it hurts without helping It helps me verify that the software I use comes from the developer I expected. It may not be a catch-all but I find value in this. Don't forget, your door lock can be opened in seconds and the person it inconveniences is mostly you, especially if you lock your keys inside. Your argument would be far more convincing if you took no precautions whatsoever because someone with millions to spend can bypass them.
- ebg13 6y ago
  > It helps me verify that the software I use comes from the developer I expected. Nobody needs to charge money for me to be able to sign my executables with something like PGP. > The cert certifies an identity, that's it. It doesn't magically clean any malware inside, that you know the identity, or that you have to trust it. And yet the message is very clearly "THIS IS UNSAFE" because "WE don't know the guy". It isn't "Don't run"/"Run anyway thanks." It's "DON'T RUN" in BOLD in an eye-catching bright box in a prominent location where buttons go and "(more info)" in body text somewhere else.
  - close04 6y ago
    > Nobody needs to charge money Your initial argument was against SmartScreen, not against paying. Now it's that things should be free. A cert costs because it gives you access to an already established infrastructure, integrated with everything, where you can easily verify the identify being certified. Business opportunity for you: set up a similar infra for PGP but free. Something that can be integrated with an OS and can instantly allow me to see what a certificate would. Then make sure your infra don't become the point of failure. You can also implement a reputation system where a new developer gets a warning but one that's not intrusive, almost easy to miss... I will gladly use it (and I'm sure OS makers will too once you prove your solution is at least as solid as PKI) because I want the functionality, not the particular implementation. > because "WE don't know the guy" I don't know the guy either because there's not kind of identification attached to the package. A clear identification and reputation systems definitely help. Both of these are widely used on the internet today because it's pretty much the only way anyone ever came up with to discourage offenders. I will say it again and again: it raises the bar for a successful attack. > It isn't "Don't run"/"Run anyway thanks." It's "DON'T RUN" Which is almost identical to a browser security warning. It stands to reason that protecting your own machine should have an even more prominent message. If you jump from one line of argumentation to another you'll never make a point. And your "solution" was to suggest that any security measure which can be bypassed by someone with millions of dollars to spend on this should not be implemented at all. Which is not even worthy of discussion.

by ebg13 6y ago

> With that kind of money they can pretty much bypass any measure an OS manufacturer could reasonably put in place Exactly. That's why this should just stop. Because it hurts without helping.

close04 6y ago

> That's why this should just stop So they should stop (discontinue) every measure that can be bypassed by an outfit with this kind of money? That doesn't leave many measures, if any. And it lowers the bar for a successful attack to someone with a couple of hours to spare. SmartScreen prompts are just like any HTTP error in a browser. The cert certifies an identity, that's it. It doesn't magically clean any malware inside, that you know the identity, or that you have to trust it. > it hurts without helping It helps me verify that the software I use comes from the developer I expected. It may not be a catch-all but I find value in this. Don't forget, your door lock can be opened in seconds and the person it inconveniences is mostly you, especially if you lock your keys inside. Your argument would be far more convincing if you took no precautions whatsoever because someone with millions to spend can bypass them.

ebg13 6y ago
> It helps me verify that the software I use comes from the developer I expected. Nobody needs to charge money for me to be able to sign my executables with something like PGP. > The cert certifies an identity, that's it. It doesn't magically clean any malware inside, that you know the identity, or that you have to trust it. And yet the message is very clearly "THIS IS UNSAFE" because "WE don't know the guy". It isn't "Don't run"/"Run anyway thanks." It's "DON'T RUN" in BOLD in an eye-catching bright box in a prominent location where buttons go and "(more info)" in body text somewhere else.
- close04 6y ago
  > Nobody needs to charge money Your initial argument was against SmartScreen, not against paying. Now it's that things should be free. A cert costs because it gives you access to an already established infrastructure, integrated with everything, where you can easily verify the identify being certified. Business opportunity for you: set up a similar infra for PGP but free. Something that can be integrated with an OS and can instantly allow me to see what a certificate would. Then make sure your infra don't become the point of failure. You can also implement a reputation system where a new developer gets a warning but one that's not intrusive, almost easy to miss... I will gladly use it (and I'm sure OS makers will too once you prove your solution is at least as solid as PKI) because I want the functionality, not the particular implementation. > because "WE don't know the guy" I don't know the guy either because there's not kind of identification attached to the package. A clear identification and reputation systems definitely help. Both of these are widely used on the internet today because it's pretty much the only way anyone ever came up with to discourage offenders. I will say it again and again: it raises the bar for a successful attack. > It isn't "Don't run"/"Run anyway thanks." It's "DON'T RUN" Which is almost identical to a browser security warning. It stands to reason that protecting your own machine should have an even more prominent message. If you jump from one line of argumentation to another you'll never make a point. And your "solution" was to suggest that any security measure which can be bypassed by someone with millions of dollars to spend on this should not be implemented at all. Which is not even worthy of discussion.