3 ms·

What little I ever read about this, the crudest trigger mechanism is the “shotgun” system (I’m assuming you are talking about this): https://en.m.wikipedia.org

What little I ever read about this, the crudest trigger mechanism is the “shotgun” system (I’m assuming you are talking about this): https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun-type_fission_weapon https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun-type_fission_weapon Can an organization get that amount of material as far as we know?

rolph 6y ago
it would be more feasible if it were stolen as theres a fair bit of monitoring going on we made a bit of a big deal when it was revealed uranium yellow cake was being produced in quantity >In the Little Boy design, the U-235 "bullet" had a mass of around 86 pounds (39 kg), and it was 7 inches (17.8 cm) long, with a diameter of 6.25 inches (15.9 cm). The hollow cylindrical shape made it subcritical. It was powered by a cordite charge. The uranium target spike was about 57.3 pounds (26 kg).< https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun-type_fission_weapon https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun-type_fission_weapon
NathanKP 6y ago
Yeah so the "gun type" is even cruder. I was thinking of the implosion type, which is what the Trinity device and Nagasaki bomb used: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design#Implosion-type_weapon https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design#Implos... Even with all the work they put into making the implosion hold the fissionable material together it still apparently only consumed about 20% of the material. But yeah its unlikely a terrorist org could get enough material for a "gun type" and the implosion type would also be very, very hard to get right
- jabl 6y ago
  AFAIU the consensus among non-proliferation experts is that given access to HEU, even a relatively unsophisticated terrorist group could make a gun type weapon. That's why access to HEU is so tightly controlled with a lot of effort expended to minimize use of it. See e.g. the RERTR program to convert research reactors to LEU. And why the international community is aghast when some country like Iran tries to build up enrichment capability. OTOH a plutonium implosion type device is a lot more difficult to get right, and is practically out of reach for non-state actors. On top of the device engineering difficulty itself, producing the raw materials is difficult too. The actual production of weapons grade plutonium isn't terribly difficult (e.g. a natural uranium fueled graphite moderated reactor), separating the Pu from the spent fuel with the PUREX process is fairly expensive and complicated.

rolph 6y ago

it would be more feasible if it were stolen as theres a fair bit of monitoring going on we made a bit of a big deal when it was revealed uranium yellow cake was being produced in quantity >In the Little Boy design, the U-235 "bullet" had a mass of around 86 pounds (39 kg), and it was 7 inches (17.8 cm) long, with a diameter of 6.25 inches (15.9 cm). The hollow cylindrical shape made it subcritical. It was powered by a cordite charge. The uranium target spike was about 57.3 pounds (26 kg).< https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun-type_fission_weapon https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun-type_fission_weapon

NathanKP 6y ago

Yeah so the "gun type" is even cruder. I was thinking of the implosion type, which is what the Trinity device and Nagasaki bomb used: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design#Implosion-type_weapon https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design#Implos... Even with all the work they put into making the implosion hold the fissionable material together it still apparently only consumed about 20% of the material. But yeah its unlikely a terrorist org could get enough material for a "gun type" and the implosion type would also be very, very hard to get right

jabl 6y ago
AFAIU the consensus among non-proliferation experts is that given access to HEU, even a relatively unsophisticated terrorist group could make a gun type weapon. That's why access to HEU is so tightly controlled with a lot of effort expended to minimize use of it. See e.g. the RERTR program to convert research reactors to LEU. And why the international community is aghast when some country like Iran tries to build up enrichment capability. OTOH a plutonium implosion type device is a lot more difficult to get right, and is practically out of reach for non-state actors. On top of the device engineering difficulty itself, producing the raw materials is difficult too. The actual production of weapons grade plutonium isn't terribly difficult (e.g. a natural uranium fueled graphite moderated reactor), separating the Pu from the spent fuel with the PUREX process is fairly expensive and complicated.