13 ms·
CA Root expired on 30 May 2020
- encoderer 6y agoI have never really wanted to go "serverless" until today. TIL that I can buy a cert that expires in a year that is signed by a root certificate that expires sooner. Still not sure WHY this is the case, but this is definitely the case.
- Sphax 6y agoAs far as I understand your certificate is still valid but you need to remove the intermediate certificate from your bundle. That was the case for me anyway.
- encoderer 6y agoIf your traffic comes from a browser you are fine with this but if you're coming from e.g. Curl you will find that you need to include an intermediate chain. (The reason for the difference being that browser stay up to date, many old client systems do not.) We ended up getting a new cert from a different provider.
- Thorrez 6y agoYou only need to remove the cert if you want to support buggy clients. If none of your clients are buggy, it will be fine to leave the expired cert in the chain.
- ta17711771 6y agoBecause the certificate authority paradigm is LITERALLY INSANE.
- AmericanChopper 6y agoIt’s the PKI paradigm that creates most of the insanity. Authentication is still an unsolved issue with PKI, there’s many ways that you can perform authentication, but all of the different approaches lead to one form of insanity or another. The CA system has its share of insanity, but it is the most successful PKI implementation in history, and by a long way.
- pwdisswordfish2 6y agoPKI authentication is only insane when delegated to a third party. There is a built-in assumption within the CA system that no two parties can ever trust each other and intermediaries are always needed. A world of strangers who never learn anything about or get to know each other. It is either impractical or impossible for the first party to trust the second, using this system, without third party intervention. What reason is there that a website owner should never send a CSR to an end user who creates her own CA cert? Why are third parties the only ones permitted by websites to sign their certificates? Welcome to the world wide web of middlemen.
- AmericanChopper 6y agoWell you can’t perform authentication over an insecure channel, and you can’t have a secure channel without authentication. Either you trust an authority, or you authenticate manually yourself. There’s a reason TLS uses the CA system, and not PGP.
- pwdisswordfish2 6y agoYou can authenticate outside of the insecure channel. There is a real world outside of the internet. It is this "manual authentication" that the CA system does not account for. It is not an option. Why is it that, in practice, the only certificates an end user's "CA" can sign are the end user's server certificates?
- AmericanChopper 6y ago> You can authenticate outside of the insecure channel. There is a real world outside of the internet. Exactly, and you can look at how much of a failure PGP has been to see how successful that approach is. > Why is it that, in practice, the only certificates an end user's "CA" can sign are the end user's server certificates? CAs can sign any X.509 certificate. They only authenticate domain control or business ownership (via “EV”), though. CA certs also aren’t only used for TLS. You can get a code signing cert from a CA for instance. You can write a very long list of perfectly valid complaints about the CA system. However it is undeniably the most successful PKI ever implemented, and not just by a little bit. This isn’t because CAs are bad at what they do. It’s because there is absolutely no elegant solution to that problem. If you want to authenticate identity manually, then I wish you luck finding one or two other people to join you. If you want to securely communicate with people you don’t know personally, or who don’t know how to/can’t be bothered to maintain their own set of private keys, then you’re going to need to establish trust via a 3rd party authority.
- cmbuckley 6y agoThat’s not the case — all certs are cross-signed with a newer root. The real problem is that certificate issuers have been giving people the old CA chain instead of the new one.
- luckylion 6y agoAny predictions how much the usage of CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false will increase in the next 7 days?
- gregmac 6y agoYikes.. yeah, if you're going to do this, consider wrapping it in an `if (date < 2020-06-15)` and be sure to fix it properly before then. This reduces the ability to just forget about it (or have the fix constantly deprioritized) and leave your software with a security vulnerablty.
- josephcsible 6y agoIMO, there's a bit of a design flaw with curl here. There should be an easy flag to say "trust the particular certificate with this hash, no matter what's wrong with it", but there isn't, so people instead use the one that says "trust whatever certificate you get, no matter what's wrong with it".
- user5994461 6y agoTrusting a specific hash would blow up when the service rotate its self-signed certificate, defeating the point of ignoring certificate error.
- josephcsible 6y agoIf you're rotating a self-signed certificate, then how do you suppose that clients securely trust it? Or if you just mean replacing it when it expires, then this could instead be tied to the underlying public key alone, which can be reused.
- pornel 6y agoIf your clients support "rotating" self-signed certs just like that, it's a huge MITM vulnerability and makes HTTPS as secure as a TSA checkpoint.
- elithrar 6y ago
- elithrar 6y agoGreat thread by Ryan Sleevi tracking the many (and growing) reports of issues caused by this root expiring: https://twitter.com/sleevi_/status/1266647545675210753 https://twitter.com/sleevi_/status/1266647545675210753 Top offender so far seems to be GnuTLS.
- Mojah 6y agoThis issue is largely cause by people still stuffing old root certificates in their certificate chains, and serving that to their users. As a general rule of thumb: 1) You don't need to add root certificates to your certificate chain 2) You especially don't need to add expired root certificates to the chain For additional context and the ability to check using `openssl` what certificates you should modify in your chain, I found this post useful: https://ohdear.app/blog/resolving-the-addtrust-external-ca-root-certificate-expiration https://ohdear.app/blog/resolving-the-addtrust-external-ca-r...
- encoderer 6y agoAny guess at what percentage is this versus the case where these certs are cross-signed with a newer root but older clients with outdated bundles do not trust the newer root? (At Cronitor, we saw about a 10% drop in traffic, presumably from those with outdated bundles)
- Mojah 6y agoHard to say, as we don't have any insights into the client-side. But we can say that only ~2% of our clients had expiring root certificates in their chain in the last few weeks, so it's definitely a minority. Since you don't control the clients in anyway, it might be that there are clients that haven't updated their local certificate stores in ages and don't yet trust the new root certificates.
- toast0 6y agoYou shouldn't need to send the root certificate (unless the clients are _really_ dumb, but I worked with a lot of dumb clients, and did not see any issues with only sending intermediates and the entity cert), but a fair number of cert chain verifiers are fairly dumb and won't stop when they get to a root they know which makes things tricky. If some of your clients don't have the UserTrust CA, but do have the AddTrust CA, up until today, you probably wanted to include the UserTrust CA cert signed by AddTrust. Clients with the UserTrust CA should see that the intermediate cert is signed by UserTrust and not even read that cross signed cert, but many do see the cross signed cert and then make the trust decision based on the AddTrust CA. It's hard to identify clients in the TLS handshake to give them a cert chain tailored to their individual needs; there's some extensions for CA certs supported, but they're largely unused.
- seibelj 6y agoDataDog failed this morning because of root CA issue.[0] Was a fun Saturday morning with 5000 alarms blowing up my phone. [0] https://status.datadoghq.com/incidents/6bqpd511nj4h https://status.datadoghq.com/incidents/6bqpd511nj4h
- jimdigriz 6y agoYeah, took me a while to figure this out, the alerts were not welcome. Found it ironic that the top of their page advertises "Security Monitoring now available".
- Operyl 6y agoDatadog failed, and our WAF provider failed at the same time too (internal services). It was .. rather confusing at it seemed like the sky was falling D: .
- x3n0ph3n3 6y agoThanks for mentioning this, since it caused me to go check metrics and find they weren't coming in... Luckily only a couple of my alarms come from metrics via the agent itself.
- aarmenaa 6y agoDatadog has shit the bed for us multiple times in the last six months. Unannounced breaking API changes, unaddressed bugs, and now their embedded cert expired. Our org is currently divided over further commitment to the service, or leaving them entirely. They've made it very hard to argue in their favor.
- SteveNuts 6y agoTheir pricing doesn't scale well either, IMO. We have several hundred hosts running and for some of the smaller instance types it costs just as much to monitor than it does to run the entire machine.
- fragsworth 6y agoSome users on Safari (probably old versions) appear to be getting bad cert warnings for https://www.playsaurus.com https://www.playsaurus.com. REALLY glad I found this post here, it was driving me nuts.
- MobileVet 6y agoThis appears to have caused our Heroku managed apps to go offline for 70+ minutes. https://status.heroku.com/incidents/2034 https://status.heroku.com/incidents/2034 Anyone that was already connected was able to continue accessing the sites but new connections failed. This mostly affected web users. Our main app server continued to crank along thankfully (also on Heroku) and that kept the mobile traffic going which is 90% of our users. Edit: adding Heroku ticket link
- badrabbit 6y agoShouldn't it be fairly simple to monitor expiry's that affect a lot of sites using censys.io dataset?
- taypo 6y agoWe had our CI systems fail today because of this. They were running Ubuntu 16.04. Check the below thread, they say an openssl bug is also a contributing factor. Removing the expired root CA fixed the issue for me. (edit: removed from the clients) https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/gshh70/sectigo_root_ca_expiring_may_not_be_handled_well/ https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/gshh70/sectigo_root_...
- ric2b 6y agoCloudAMPQ (managed RabbitMQ) was affected: https://status.cloudamqp.com/ https://status.cloudamqp.com/ Caused us some connections issues that required a restart of both our clients and the rabbitmq cluster.
- CarlHoerberg 6y agoyes, a bunch of older clusters were affected by this. They included an intermediate of USERTrust that was signed by AddTrust, clients that didn't check for alternate chains would then fail. We pushed the new chain (which now only includes the server cert and the Sectigo RSA cert), and dynamically reloaded the TLS listener in RabbitMQ, it should have solved it for most ppl, email support@cloudamqp.com if it didn't for you. We're sorry we didn't pushed this earlier. We were aware that the AddTrust would expire during the life time of the server certificate, but we assumed that all TLS client would find the valid chain regardless, that assumption was obviously wrong.
- jeffbee 6y agoQuick reminder from your friendly local SRE: never ever issue certificates that expire on weekends. Make certs expire in the middle of the afternoon on a business day wherever your operators live and work. The cert in question expires at May 30 10:48:38 2020 GMT, which smells suspiciously like a fixed time after the cert was generated, rather than at a well-chosen point in time.
- encoderer 6y agoGreat tip. Did you notice that cert in this case was issued 20 years ago? It’s crazy to me that it was still being used to sign certs as recently as last week (according to twitter)
- jeffbee 6y agoOf course, but that doesn't really excuse them. My first experience with middle-of-Sunday-night SSL certificate expiration was in December 1998, and it was already a well-known doctrine by then. I'd expect a commercial certificate authority to have these kinds of things squared away.
- user5994461 6y agoMy experience with commercial CA is that they set the expiry exactly 1 year from creation. Doesn't matter if it's a week end or a holiday.
- sjtindell 6y agoGenerally that’s for Server certs, Roots and Intermediates will be multiple years from what I’ve seen. Roots in particular 10+ years.
- abiogenesis 6y ago1 Year is a relatively recent thing. Previously you were able to buy server certs with a 5 year expiration.
- vld 6y agoip-api.com was also affected by this. After our first alert at 10:49 (cert expired at 10:48:38) and a minute of being puzzled as to why our certificate expired, we realized the root we bundled is the issue. We finished updating our primary API servers at 10:55.
- ta17711771 6y agoSurely the current CA paradigm shouldn't continue to be accepted by the people who keep infrastructure running anymore? We need to do something.
- jpalomaki 6y agoAt least for many web apps the future is likely automatically created and managed domain validated certificates. Amazon and Azure provide these free of charge and then you have Let’s encrypt. This does not change the CA paradigm, but removes many operational issues.
- compumike 6y agoStripe Webhooks are currently failing "for some users" https://twitter.com/stripestatus/status/1266756286734938116 https://twitter.com/stripestatus/status/1266756286734938116 -- some chance that's related. Edit: for https://www.circuitlab.com/ https://www.circuitlab.com/ we saw all Stripe webhooks failing from 4:08am through 12:04pm PDT today with "TLS error". Since 12:04pm (5 minutes ago), some webhooks are succeeding and others are still failing. Edit 2: since 12:17pm all webhooks are succeeding again. Thanks Stripe!
- compumike 6y agoFor backwards compatibility, I updated our intermediate certificates to provide the AAA Certificate Services signing https://censys.io/certificates/68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665db61bbdb109e00f05ca9f74244ee5f5f52b https://censys.io/certificates/68b9c761219a5b1f0131784474665... to replace the expired 2nd intermediate certificate. (Modifying the "GandiStandardSSLCA2.pem" file in my case.)
- admax88q 6y agoHonestly, certificates should never expire or should expire daily. If certificate revocation works then its pointless to have expiring certs. Its just a mechanism for CAs to seek rent. If certificate revocation doesnt work then certs need to expire super frequently to limit potential damage if compromised. A certificate that expires in 20 years does absolutely nothing for security compared to a certificate that never expires. Odds are that in 20 years the crypto will need to be updated anyways, effectively revoking the certificate.
- josephcsible 6y agoExactly. Certificate expiration has never really been about security. It's purely for practicality, so that CRLs won't grow without bound. This is especially true now that we have OCSP stapling. From a security perspective, a short-lived certificate is exactly equivalent to a long-lived certificate with mandatory OCSP stapling and a short-lived OCSP response, but the latter is much more complicated. And in this case since it's a root, it goes even further than that. Root CA's can't be revoked anyway, so if they're compromised, a software update to distrust it is required. There's really not a good reason for them to expire at all.
- sleevi 6y agoIt’s not true that expiration is not about security. Dan Geer’s talk in 1998, noted at https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~goguen/courses/275f00/geer.html https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~goguen/courses/275f00/geer.html , is just as relevant today in the design of key management systems. Expiration is not “just” about cryptographic risk either; there are plenty of operational risks. If you’re putting your server on the Internet, and exposing a service, you should be worried about key compromise, whether by hacker or by Heartbleed. Lifetimes are a way of expressing, and managing, that risk, especially in a world where revocation has a host of failure modes (operational, legal/political, interoperability) that may not be desirable. As for Root expiration, it’s definitely more complicated than being black and white. It’s a question about whether software should fail-secure (fail-closed) or fail-insecure (fail-open). The decision to trust a CA, by a software vendor, is in theory backed by a variety of evidence, such as the CA’s policies and practices, as well as additional evidence such as audits. On expiration, under today’s model, all of those requirements largely disappear; the CA is free to do whatever they want with the key. Rejecting expired roots is, in part, a statement that what is secure now can’t be guaranteed as secure in 5 years, or 10 years, or 6 months, whatever the vendor decides. They can choose to let legacy software continue to work, but insecurely, potentially laying the accidental groundwork for the botnets of tomorrow, or they can choose to have legacy software stop working then, on the assumption that if they were receiving software updates, they would have received an update to keep things working / extend the timer. Ultimately, this is what software engineering is: balancing these tradeoffs, both locally and in the broader ecosystem, to try and find the right balance.
- halukakin 6y agoSite24x7's ssl monitor caught this for us yesterday. And i thought they were wrong as we purchased this last certificate just a few months back.
- niffydroid 6y agoThankfully our uptime services spotted this earlier in the week. I'm terrible with certs, so no idea why a cert we brought this year is even using this root ca. To be honest, things like let's encrypt or cloud services which manage ssl is a great help
- abiogenesis 6y agoIt uses two root CAs, one old and one new. Your web server must be serving the intermediate certificate signed by the older CA.
- itsthecourier 6y agoOh god, today was an interesting day. 8am, updating thousands of servers CAs...
- LeonM 6y agoThis one bit me today and abruptly ended my day at the beach. The certificate reseller advised my customer that it was okay to include the cross-signing cert in the chain, because browsers will automatically ignore it once it expires, and use the Comodo CA root instead. And that was true for browsers I guess. But my customer also has about 100 machines in the field that use cURL to access their HTTPS API endpoint. cURL will throw an error if one of the certs in the chain has expired (may be dependent on the order, don't know). Anyway, 100 machines went down and I had a stressed out customer on the phone.
- 0x0 6y agoSounds like a good test case for exercising those otherwise useless "million dollar insurances" that some certificate vendors flash in their sales materials?
- donmcronald 6y agoHave you ever read the terms? I don't know if they even publish them anymore, but I read one many years ago. TLDR; 1. The CA must misissue a cert. 2. The misissued cert is used by a malicious party to impersonate you. 3. Every user (your users) must prove their damages and claim individually. 4. There might have been a low maximum, per-user claim, but I can't remember. I'd be amazed if there's a single person on the internet who's been paid out by that warranty.
- tialaramex 6y agoYes, it's useless insurance. The interesting thing is that useless insurance is illegal to sell in lots of places† - to consumers, but here the insurance was sold to the root CAs which are huge corporations so they don't care that it's useless because they only bought it as a PR exercise. †This is the root of a huge scandal in the UK that resulted in banks refunding people years of fees for a product called PPI which they should never have been sold. As a secondary effect this resulted in annoying spam from firms who'd help you claim your money back. By the end I almost felt sad I hadn't fallen for the original scam, because I was being inconvenienced by all the spam but (since I hadn't lost anything) not getting a pile of cash as a refund.
- bransonf 6y agoFairly certain this affected Kroger. My sister called me this morning asking to troubleshoot why her laptop was warning of an unsecured connection. Perhaps a coincidence, but also likely that their cert expired.
- dvdkhlng 6y agoThis just hit me via Debian's 'apt-get update': I'm using jitsi's package repository which is hosted via HTTPS and seems to rely on the expired root-CA. Certificate checks started failing for everybody a few hours ago [1]. That's quite bad, as I tried to do a clean re-install of jitsi-meet, and now I have no installation at all any more. [1] https://github.com/jitsi/jitsi-meet/issues/6918 https://github.com/jitsi/jitsi-meet/issues/6918
- snapetom 6y agoYep. Got woken up early today for this. We renewed our cert about a month and two days ago. Namecheap, the vendor, sent us the bad AddTrust cert in the bundle. They weren't updating the bundles until two days after we renewed the cert.
- Cymen 6y agoSame exact thing happened to me (Namecheap, PositiveSSL, renewed roughly a month ago). I went the reissue route on Namecheap and that fixed it (and I ended up with a certificate chain that is one certificate shorter).
- pixmin 6y agoEverything is fine with PKI and SSL certificates. It was a bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 / 1.0.2 in dealing with two times cross-signed root CA. It is fixed in 1.1.1, but these older versions are still default on RHEL6/RHEL7/Centos6/Centos7 and even Ubuntu16.04. I think a large portion of online communications have been affected today.
- josephcsible 6y agoIt's really ironic that only "stable" distros were affected by this, and that distros with software closer to bleeding-edge worked fine through it.
- sleevi 6y agoAndrew Ayer has a write-up about this at https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/fixing_the_addtrust_root_expiration https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/fixing_the_addtrust_root_exp... At the core, this is not a problem with the server, or the CA, but with the clients. However, servers have to deal with broken clients, so it’s easy to point at the server and say it was broken, or to point at the server and say it’s fixed, but that’s not quite the case. I discussed this some in https://twitter.com/sleevi_/status/1266647545675210753 https://twitter.com/sleevi_/status/1266647545675210753 , as clients need to be prepared to discover and explore alternative certificate paths. Almost every major CA relies on cross-certificates, some even with circular loops (e.g. DigiCert), and clients need to be capable of exploring those certificates and finding what they like. There’s not a single canonical “correct” certificate chain, because of course different clients trust different CAs. Regardless of your CA, you can still do things to reduce the risk. Using tools like mkbundle in CFSSL (with https://github.com/cloudflare/cfssl_trust https://github.com/cloudflare/cfssl_trust ) or https://whatsmychaincert.com/ https://whatsmychaincert.com/ help configure a chain that will maximize interoperability, even with dumb and old clients. Of course, using shorter lived certificates, and automating them, also helps prepare your servers, by removing the toil from configuring changes and making sure you pickup updates (to the certificate path) in a timely fashion. Tools like Censys can be used to explore the certificate graph and visualize the nodes and edges. You’ll see plenty of sites rely on this, and that means clients need to not be lazy in how they verify certificates. Or, alternatively, that root stores should impose more rules on how CAs sign such cross-certificates, to reduce the risk posed to the ecosystem by these events.
- telesilla 6y agoAndrew Ayer's tip on getting Debian sorted may have saved me hours.
- mehrdadn 6y agoGiven you mention OpenSSL is currently terrible at verifying "real" certificates: why doesn't e.g. Google just throw a bit of money at them and fix their bugs when they're clearly so well-known? It seems like such an obvious thing to do for a company whose entire business is built on the web. Is there really too little benefit to justify the cost of the engineer(s) it would take even for big companies? Or are the projects somehow blocking help?
- m-p-3 6y agoThat explains why some of Integromat automations failed, they rely on Sectigo when I checked this morning.
- zouhair 6y agoI was wondering why Lynx started spouting some nonsense: $ lynx -dump https://wiki.factorio.com/Version_history Looking up wiki.factorio.com Making HTTPS connection to wiki.factorio.com SSL callback:certificate has expired, preverify_ok=0, ssl_okay=0 Retrying connection without TLS. Looking up wiki.factorio.com Making HTTPS connection to wiki.factorio.com SSL callback:certificate has expired, preverify_ok=0, ssl_okay=0 Alert!: Unable to make secure connection to remote host. lynx: Can't access startfile https://wiki.factorio.com/Version_history
- 0x0 6y agoAre we going to experience the same bug next year for all LetsEncrypt certificates when the DST Root CA X3 expires? I guess modern devices could deal with LetsEncrypt issuing directly from their own modern ISRG Root X1, but would that leave legacy clients completely stranded (iOS <10, older versions of Windows and Android...?)
- phonon 6y agohttps://letsencrypt.org/2019/04/15/transitioning-to-isrg-root.html https://letsencrypt.org/2019/04/15/transitioning-to-isrg-roo...
- tialaramex 6y agoYou'll get two different but related bugs but yes, assuredly something will break and somebody will be angry about it. The first thing that'll happen is Let's Encrypt's systems will tell systems by default to present certificate chains which don't mention DST Root CA X3. Lots of systems will, as a result, automatically switch to such a chain when renewing and you'll see a gentle trickle of weird bugs over ~90 days starting this summer unless Let's Encrypt moves the date. Those bugs will be from clients that somehow in 2020 both didn't trust the ISRG root and couldn't imagine their way to using a different trust path not presented by the server. Somebody more expert in crap certificate verification software can probably tell you exactly which programs will fail and how. Then there will be months of peace in which seemingly everything is now fine. Then in September 2021 the other shoe drops. Clients that didn't trust ISRG but had managed to cobble together their own trust path to DST Root CA X3 now notice it has expired on services which present a modern chain or no chain at all. Those sites which deliberately used the legacy DST Root CA X3 chain to buy a few more months of compatibility likewise see errors, but hopefully they at least knew this was coming and are expecting it. But there are also sites using crappy ACME clients that didn't obey the spec. They've hard coded DST Root CA X3 not because they wanted compatibility at all costs and are prepared for it to end in September, but because they just pasted together whatever seemed to work without obeying the ACME spec and so even though Let's Encrypt's servers have told them not to use that old certificate chain they aren't listening. Those services now mysteriously break too, even in some relatively modern clients that would trust ISRG, because the service is presenting a chain that insists on DSR Root CA X3 and they aren't smart enough to ignore that. On the upside, lots of Let's Encrypt certs are just to make somebody's web site work, and an ordinary modern web browser has been battle-tested against this crap for years, so it will soldier on.
- PixelPaul 6y agoThe amount of times I told the CA that this will be an issue is a lot. And the amount of time they replied saying there will be no issue is every single time. Dam I hate CAs like Comodo
- userbinator 6y agoA bit of an aside, but While Android 2.3 Gingerbread does not have the modern roots installed and relies on AddTrust, it also does not support TLS 1.2 or 1.3, and is unsupported and labelled obsolete by the vendor. If the platform doesn’t support modern algorithms (SHA-2, for example) then you will need to speak to that system vendor about updates. I find things like that really really irritating. Crypto is basically maths, and a very pure form at that, so should be one of the most portable types of software in existence. Computers have been doing maths since before they were machines. Instead, the forced obolescence bandwagon has made companies take this very pure and portable technology and tied it to their platform's versions, using the "security" argument to bait and coerce users into taking other unwanted changes, and possibly replacing hardware that is otherwise functional (and, as mentioned earlier, is perfectly capable of executing the relevant code) along with all the ecological impact that has. Adding new root certificates at least for PCs is rather easy due to their extreme portability, but I wish the same could be said of crypto algorithms/libraries.
- josephcsible 6y agoYou're mad at the wrong people. The security argument is legitimate, so there's no need for your scare quotes. The weaknesses in TLS older than 1.2 are real. You should instead be upset at device vendors for deciding to drop support for devices so quickly. If they'd just keep supplying updates, or even open-source everything so the community could, then this wouldn't be an issue.
- zozbot234 6y agoThese days, Android 2.3 Gingerbread devices are essentially obsolete even from a strictly hardware point of view. Most of those were actually very well supported by the old CyanogenMod releases, but few people would even bother trying to bring up something reasonably modern like pmOS by building on that work, the specs are just that bad.
- toast0 6y agoYou could ship better crypto (and updated CAs) with your app for Android -- then you could get support for whatever you like on all versions. But it might not use hardware acceleration if available, and hardware running Gingerbread needs crypto acceleration if available. TLS 1.3 isn't all that much code if you can use the system x.509 and system ciphers, or maybe pick one or two ciphers to ship if they're not there; I'd guess TLS 1.2 isn't that much code either, the complexity comes from trying to support lots of versions -- and from X.509 which has a lot of stuff to process. I think Chrome for Android did include TLS 1.2 at least, when it was shipping for Gingerbread.
- minaguib 6y agoI've maintained some high-level notes on this event, problems and fixes here: https://gist.github.com/minaguib/c8db186af450bceaaa7c452b76a9901b https://gist.github.com/minaguib/c8db186af450bceaaa7c452b76a...
- antaviana 6y agoHow would this affect a code signing certificate issued by Sectigo last month?
- aarbor989 6y agoWe had to get an entirely new certificate to resolve this. We had recently migrated our docker images to be based on Amazon Linux 2, and low a behold, there was no easy way we found to upgrade to the required version of OpenSSL on Amazon Linux 2. Was easier to just upgrade our certificates
- spleen 6y agoThis workaround fixed the problem on our servers: https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=945042&tstart=0 https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=945042&t...
- josephcsible 6y agoYou didn't need to do that. You could have kept your leaf certificate and just swapped out the expired intermediate certificate.