Toolchain compromises are a non-zero risk but involve a lot of orchestrated resources to subvert systems to meaningful effect (simple exfil is sufficient for mo

Toolchain compromises are a non-zero risk but involve a lot of orchestrated resources to subvert systems to meaningful effect (simple exfil is sufficient for most corporate espionage v. stuff like Stuxnet to enact specific changes covertly). A company doing that given legislation to keep recommendation behavior and policies transparent to the public would be violating the spirit of the regulation by creating more opacity and delusion, no question. Admittedly, they're not going to be prosecuted in our current regulatory cyberpunk-esque hellscape, but neither would any public-benefit regulation pass anyway making the discussion of subversion moot, right? So presuming such a societal environment where regulation _could_ pass, we would hopefully have a more effective regulatory policy framework where subversion of the intent to be transparent for the sake of public safety and trust while still protecting trade secrets would be under sufficient scrutiny. All I know is that engineer-activists like Jaron Lanier are working with more tech-aware activists / politicians like Yang in proposing more effective tech regulatory frameworks than the past, and their efforts should be a lot more effective than either the current collective actions of the throwing up of our hands or yelling, whining, and screaming hoarsely. From a regulatory standpoint mirroring the nature of our organizational tendencies, I posit that the _policy_ models should look similar to Mickens' security threat vector model - Not-Mossad or Mossad.