Bad implementations of a feature do not make the feature bad as well. If you as a site owner allow for example a password reset based on just answering the secr

Bad implementations of a feature do not make the feature bad as well. If you as a site owner allow for example a password reset based on just answering the secret question, guess what: bad implementation. If you don't inform the users what the secret question can be used for, guess what: bad implementation. If your users choose to use a question that has an answer that can be found easy its the same as having a user use for password the word 'password'. I can go on and on about how you can get something like this wrong. Lets say that my computer gets keyloged and the attacker gets the account/password of site X and my email info aswell. Now the attacker wants to take over both of the accounts. Lets see how things will go if no secret question is involved: At best site X for a password change will require a e-mail confirmation, probably by just providing the old password the attacker will be able to change it. On top of that the site that hosts my e-mail can't be linked to something else, because of that i guess by simply providing my old password the attacker will get over my e-mail too. HOWEVER if the sites require a secret question/answer verification the attacker wont be able to take over my accounts. And i am able to change both the password and get full control of the accounts. Secret question/answer feature should be treated as a MASTER password. You have your casual password which allows you to identify yourself to the system etc but if you want to change some critical information of the account you will have to provide you master password. If both the site and the user make good use of the feature there is nothing wrong with it.