4 ms·
As I understand it, this is not a big deal: there are multiple CT servers, and auditors verifying their entries, the design of the system assumes the possibilit
by cjbprime 6y ago
As I understand it, this is not a big deal: there are multiple CT servers, and auditors verifying their entries, the design of the system assumes the possibility of compromised log operators.
- some_furry 6y agoCorrect. It's an interesting incident, but the consequences for Internet users are pretty much zero. (Conversely, multiple CT server compromises would be a significant concern, but even then without a compromised Certificate Authority, the impact is almost zero.)
- bawolff 6y agoWell the political consequences are kind of bad. CA system is built around trust. Not being able to secure their servers, even non critical ones, degrades trust.
- cjbprime 6y agoThe CT system is built around controlled suspicion, not trust.
- bawolff 6y agoSure, but if i can't trust someone to run a CT server, why would i trust them to run a CA?
- cjbprime 6y agoIt was a 0day in a popular open source package. They didn't do anything wrong. Presumably they use stronger defense in depth, as required by the CA guidelines, to prevent software compromises to the actual CA signing machines. There's no need to go through that level of paranoia for CT log machines.