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Wrong. Boeing engineers raised up concerns that were dismissed. “Frankly right now all my internal warning bells are going off,” said the email. “And for the f

Wrong. Boeing engineers raised up concerns that were dismissed. “Frankly right now all my internal warning bells are going off,” said the email. “And for the first time in my life, I’m sorry to say that I’m hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing airplane.” [1] [1]https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/30/boeing-engineer-raised-concerns-about-737-max-years-before-crashes-documents-show.html https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/30/boeing-engineer-raised-conce...

nickff 6y ago
I didn't say that nobody raised concerns, I said: >>"I haven't seen any evidence that someone specifically predicted the chain of events which would unfold on those flights, and clearly communicated the issue, then had executive(s) respond that it was 'worth the money'." In large projects like the MAX, there are always people raising concerns.
- whatshisface 6y ago
  >In large projects like the MAX, there are always people raising concerns. Does that mean that people raising concerns can be ignored, or does that mean that most large projects only get by with luck?
  - nickff 6y ago
    I think that's a really interesting question, but I think the answer is orthogonal to your dichotomy. In my experience, very successful projects depend on the great managers that know who to listen to in each different situation, and they know how people will react in each situation. One of the best examples of this is Dave Lewis, who lead the design of the F-4 Phantom II, one of the most successful fighter aircraft of all time. He directed the structural design team to design for 80% of the required ultimate load, because he knew that everyone was conservative in their numbers; then the design was tested. The structure ended up lighter than comparable aircraft, and the Phantom II had phenomenal performance. It also helps if the managers are good at making predictions of their own; Tetlock has written two great books about this, including: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superforecasting:_The_Art_and_Science_of_Prediction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superforecasting:_The_Art_and_...

nickff 6y ago

I didn't say that nobody raised concerns, I said: >>"I haven't seen any evidence that someone specifically predicted the chain of events which would unfold on those flights, and clearly communicated the issue, then had executive(s) respond that it was 'worth the money'." In large projects like the MAX, there are always people raising concerns.

whatshisface 6y ago
>In large projects like the MAX, there are always people raising concerns. Does that mean that people raising concerns can be ignored, or does that mean that most large projects only get by with luck?
- nickff 6y ago
  I think that's a really interesting question, but I think the answer is orthogonal to your dichotomy. In my experience, very successful projects depend on the great managers that know who to listen to in each different situation, and they know how people will react in each situation. One of the best examples of this is Dave Lewis, who lead the design of the F-4 Phantom II, one of the most successful fighter aircraft of all time. He directed the structural design team to design for 80% of the required ultimate load, because he knew that everyone was conservative in their numbers; then the design was tested. The structure ended up lighter than comparable aircraft, and the Phantom II had phenomenal performance. It also helps if the managers are good at making predictions of their own; Tetlock has written two great books about this, including: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superforecasting:_The_Art_and_Science_of_Prediction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superforecasting:_The_Art_and_...