I agree that any implementation of a new, intended-to-be-secure feature should go through rigorous testing and security review, and that the easiest way to do s

I agree that any implementation of a new, intended-to-be-secure feature should go through rigorous testing and security review, and that the easiest way to do so is to allow integration with software that already has. However, if you're implementing a Twitter replacement, people expect you to be capable of direct private messaging, with all of the UX considerations that imply—a unified account system, the ability to message everyone already on the platform, having the same look & feel as the original application, etc. The main benefit of integrated messaging for most users is leveraging the the network effects that come from having a built-in way to message others. This goes away entirely if you have to have every user download a different app and link it and hope that the people they want to talk to will do the same. And the fact of the matter is that "many apps that each do one thing well" is only a good user experience for hackers that can spend a lot of time learning and understanding the quirks of many individual apps, or already have preferences on which apps do what best. > and I have approximately 0% confidence (based on my previous experiences with Mastodon releases and code quality) Could you elaborate more on what these problems were? We've had security bugs in the past, but not many more then any other large, complicated app, and to my knowledge we've always fixed them very quickly after they were discovered. We also have a pretty good track record in encouraging adoption of critical security fixes across a large and diverse ecosystem.