>Upon reflection, it is so extractive that it seems slightly misleading to even levy it in discussion as trade. I think my contention is that how narrowly scop

>Upon reflection, it is so extractive that it seems slightly misleading to even levy it in discussion as trade. I think my contention is that how narrowly scoped this extraction is belies the alternative, of broader-based capital development which might have produced greater value in the long run. It seems impressive, because it fed the imperial machine in an extremely lucrative manner for the empire; however, what happens when you factor in the value extracted from Britain by the 20th century's wars, resulting in a rapid decline to present circumstances? The British Empire was incredibly short-lived compared to its predecessors, depending on how you look at it. Is this part of a trend? Possibly. But there's room to conceptualize the situation as one of optimizing towards catastrophe, of the entire enterprise being wrongheaded on balance, and of an alternative approach - one which doesn't strip mine non-European civilization, leaving existing structures not to collapse so violently, with ramifications to the present day - being "better" because the knock-on effects might have been less destructive. Would Mao's purge of intellectuals have happened in a world where Britain's appetite for wealth extraction had been less voracious or narrowly-focused? Would we today be reaping the rewards of Chinese academia emerging from the mid-century intact? I mean, in a sense, it's impressive what the modern war "trade" bankrolls. 200-300 years from now, will we characterize the military-industrial complex as eliciting the same sort of sense of awe, in its complexity but basic effectiveness in maintaining hegemony and access to resources crucial for the unprecedented build-up of global wealth since the 1950s?