This works sometimes. Like, the article notes, it worked for the iPod. For the iPad, it landed much softer than its predecessors, even if they still made a kill

This works sometimes. Like, the article notes, it worked for the iPod. For the iPad, it landed much softer than its predecessors, even if they still made a killing on sales. The large format was awkward to hold as a content consumption device, and while it could have made for a neat content creation device, that never became a mass-market phenomenon. Later, smaller models were then eclipsed by phones that grew in size. Then, recently, the line was repositioned to import some more traditional computing expectations, after the Surface line proved that there was demand for that paradigm. If you squint, you'll notice that the iPad wasn't a failure, but the critiques leveled against it at the time that challenged whether consumers would recognize that an iPad was something they needed turned out to be right. Those who waited and never bought an iPad were rewarded by phones that grew in size until they could reliably satisfy much of the iPad's usecase. Those who used the iPad for content creation found that software was a significant part of their workflow, which translated poorly to competing platforms that later emerged to innovate with hardware -- so their long-term retention was a blend of lock-in and merit. At first, the high price of the product initially contributed to a significant self-selection of its customer base -- by dissuading unsure prospects from an impulse buy; but this gatekeeping effect was lessened when smaller, cheaper models were introduced later. Gmail achieved gating through invitations; Facebook achieved gating through requiring an ".edu" email address. The iPad, Gmail, and Facebook all benefited from the marketing value of gating, but in the latter two's case, the network effect kicked in in earnest once the gating was lifted. In the iPad's case, once less-invested people began buying iPads, that now-shifting market of people began moving closer and closer to the consensus that it's simply a Really Big iPhone, with all the benefits and drawbacks that come with that. I'd generalize that lesson to say that your product must appeal to a self-selecting, highly-invested fan, so that it's profitable to solely cater to them and ignore everyone else. Then, to survive an intentional or unintentional pivot to a more mass-market appeal, your product must readily offer a smooth and coherent way to satisfy a set of usability needs people currently have. Gmail, Facebook, the iPod, and the iPhone did this, but the iPad fell well short.