>I can imagine a being that is physically identical to a human in every way, but is not conscious - there is no reason to think that intelligent behavior requir

>I can imagine a being that is physically identical to a human in every way, but is not conscious - there is no reason to think that intelligent behavior requires consciousness. I experience consciousness as having explanatory power for why I have conversations about the ineffability of consciousness. But if I can posit a being physically identical to myself but without consciousness, then, since the causal explanations for the duplicate's behavior are identical to my own, that means this being as well as myself have beliefs and say the things we do about consciousness, that are not caused by consciousness! My own beliefs about consciousness, supposedly incorrigible because they are directly caused or informed by consciousness, are necessarily not caused or informed by genuine consciousness, only some computational or informational imposter. But that means any reason I have to believe I am conscious, the zombie also has. It follows that either I am also a zombie or zombies are incoherent.