> I can imagine a being that is physically identical to a human in every way, but is not conscious I can't, and I think that's the central point. This means yo

> I can imagine a being that is physically identical to a human in every way, but is not conscious I can't, and I think that's the central point. This means you're claiming the big c is not a physics process. But I suspect that the next sentence is a more accurate representation of your argument: > there is no reason to think that intelligent behavior requires consciousness To which I would say, what if consciousness is just a side effect of data integration. What if it's just what if "feels like" to be a system that has memory, external and internal data integration? Nothing magical about that. > So what is the difference between such a being and a conscious human, if the two are physically identical? Again, you're tacitly assuming that consciousness is not physical, thus assuming your earlier conclusion.