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I take exception to this analysis: "The numbers killed in terrorist incidents may be small. But the threat is endemic, and the texture of everyday life has alt
by PaulDavisThe1st 7y ago
I take exception to this analysis:
"The numbers killed in terrorist incidents may be small. But the threat is endemic, and the texture of everyday life has altered profoundly. Video cameras and security procedures in public places have become part of the way we live."
The author writes about this as if our response to terrorism is some sort of deterministic feature of the natural world. Instead, however, our response is series of distinct policy choices, none of which were ever inevitable and all of which are subject to change (even if that change is hard to accomplish).
The security theater in (particularly US) airports is not a deterministic consequence of terrorism - it's the result of the policies of the GW Bush administration. The widespread use of CCTV cameras in the UK is not a deterministic response to crime and/or terrorism - it's the result of several governments worth of explicit policy, as evidenced by the remarkably lower use of such cameras in other nations affected by similar phenomena.
Talking about "what has happened" as if it was inevitable, and not the result of choices made by the powerful is dangerous and dampens the possibility of a belief in other outcomes.
- dredmorbius 7y agoThere is a diffeerence between modes of threat. A visible threat vs. an invisible one, an undirected threat vs. a directed one. Some years ago I realised that there are in fact two uses of the term "invisible* in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Among oths I find the significance of the more well-known one to be greatly overstated. But the other seems notable on several counts: "Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command are qualities which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their arms. But the noise of firearms, the smoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment exposed as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle there was no noise but what arose from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of wounds or death. Every man, till some mortal weapon actually did approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him. In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree regularity and order... Smith, WoN, Book V, Chapter 1 https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Wealth_of_Nations/Book_V/Chapter_1 https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Wealth_of_Nations/Book_V/... That is, it's the loss of certainty and security which of itself is exceptionally disruptive of order. Terrorism is (generally) rare, but is specifically directed so as to inflict maximal disruption. Disease, especially epidemics, are trust attacks. We cannot be know with any certainty what otherwise innocent and trivial encounters or activities might. have major consequence. Entirely unaware individuals may be exposing others to grave harm. Paranoia is prudence.
- PaulDavisThe1st 7y agoI don't disagree with any of that. But I also don't see what it has to do with my point that our response to any threat is often a matter of policy choices, rather than something predestined. (and of course, sometimes it isn't). You can see this even with the case of sars-cov-2, where different policy decisions about the response have contributed to (or resulted in?) different impacts around the world. I imagine we will see it going forward too, just as we do with differing responses to terrorism.
- dredmorbius 7y agoSure. As it happens, that's not the element I was reponding to. But to address it: There's a strong argument tp be made that how soccieties choose to address their challenges has a major impact on outcomes. That's the major premise and subtitle of Jared Diamond's Collapse8. Others disagree seeing that outcome as inevitable (Tainter, on whom aDiamond draws extensively). A more interesting approach tries to understand what the dynamics at play are. William Ophuls, though decidedly pessimistic, holds out hope and draws no final conclusions, though he explores the question(s) in detail, particularly in Plato's Revenge, though also in earlier works, notably Ecology and the politics of scarcity. Why* certain political responses (including thatre, denial, scapegoating, and distraction) are frequently recurrent can prove illuminating.