I do not have time to read this review but the two citations in your comment caught my attention. Let us call the property of a thing that is both only blue an

I do not have time to read this review but the two citations in your comment caught my attention. Let us call the property of a thing that is both only blue and only chartreuse — blue and solely blue, not chartreuse, in being chartreuse, and chartreuse and solely chartreuse, not blue, in being blue — blutreuse. Would not Brandom would point out that the author does not, in fact, believe that a blutreuse thing exists? I don't think it even reaches the level of what Brandom seems to be talking about, which would be more of a Heideggerian truth-as-in-the-flight-of-an-arrow, or truth as in soundness. The author may believe that he could believe that a bluetreuse thing existed, may "embrace the paradox" and refuse his 'obligation' to admit that there can be no bluetreuse thing, but in fact he is going to do nothing of value with the paradox and cannot even imagine a bluetreuse thing, regardless of what he claims.