I have noticed a tendency, in philosphical discussions in general, for one party to hoist the discussion up from a specific issue to a very general and fundamen

I have noticed a tendency, in philosphical discussions in general, for one party to hoist the discussion up from a specific issue to a very general and fundamental level. It is all very well to say that we can have no certainty whether causal laws exist or what consciousness is, but we must recognize that if that is one's argument, then one has effectively terminated the discussion as irresolvable: no matter how much empirical evidence emerges, it is not going to be enough to overcome this response. If one takes this way to leave the discussion, then there would be more than just a hint of motte-and-bailey equivocation if one were to then re-enter it with a specific claim, such as that Chalmers or Searle or Koch have a plausible argument that consiousness cannot possibly be this or that. As it happens, I very much doubt that IIT is on the right track, but at least it is (or was, initially) an attempt to find out what consciousness is, rather than what it is not.