> Let's imagine that we simulate the brain in all biological details on a supercomputer. Will that supercomputer be conscious? > No. It doesn't matter whether

> Let's imagine that we simulate the brain in all biological details on a supercomputer. Will that supercomputer be conscious? > No. It doesn't matter whether the Von Neumann machine is running a weather simulation, playing poker, or simulating the human brain; its integrated information is minute. Consciousness is not about computation; it's a causal power associated with the physics of the system. Can someone shine some light one what this might mean? I can't wrap my head around what's different about a physical system vs. a sufficiently powerful simulation. I can see an argument that there might be some complexity that is too difficult to compute, but just saying "nope, has to have complex physical connections" seems arbitrary? Edit: Ah, I missed the discussion further down the thread. Deferring to there.