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""" Let's imagine that we simulate the brain in all biological details on a supercomputer. Will that supercomputer be conscious? No. It doesn't matter whether

""" Let's imagine that we simulate the brain in all biological details on a supercomputer. Will that supercomputer be conscious? No. It doesn't matter whether the Von Neumann machine is running a weather simulation, playing poker, or simulating the human brain; its integrated information is minute. Consciousness is not about computation; it's a causal power associated with the physics of the system. """ I don't understand how anyone could answer this question this way. It's practically a tautology; if the simulation is accurate, then the person you're simulating is conscious. In other contexts, it's taken for granted that if this entire planet were running on a simulation, we wouldn't even be able to tell. Less hypothetically, this "consciousness-meter" would give a different value for a physical chip, and a perfectly accurate emulation of that chip. They're doing the exact same thing, and your meter gives a different number? Why is anyone taking this person seriously?

Koshkin 6y ago
Indeed, it should be possible to simulate all the "required" physics on a computer. (Not that it's necessary.)
- eranation 6y ago
  My totally unsubstantiated and made up take on this is that perhaps consciousness happens in the quantum side of things that we can't either measure or really simulate because we can never really observe it, e.g. we can simulate quantum behavior quite well, but only based on the observed behavior, the particle side of the particle wave duality, we don't really know for sure what happens before the wave function collapses, we just know it's a probability space (which we can predict for repeated experiments very accurately, but we don't really know how to predict a single particle, we don't even know how to measure all of its properties at the same time let alone predict it). If consciousness happens in that no locality / no realism area of the unobserved quantum state, then perhaps this is why we can't simulate it with existing technology. I have no basis to this thought other than a hunch. It also somewhat helps explain determinism vs free will (although superdeterminism is also an explanation, one that I don't really like)
  - centimeter 6y ago
    You’re throwing disconnected buzzwords around. The brain is too hot to rely on large-scale quantum entanglement. Any quantum effects that are relevant to the functioning of the brain are likely to be very small-scale and have some boring, easily-simulated effect like making ion pumps more efficient.
    - Koshkin 6y ago
      The logic appears to be simple: consciousness is mysterious, but so is quantum world, therefore they must intersect somehow.
  - Avocadoe 6y ago
    "... we don't even know how to measure all of its properties at the same time ..." I assume you're referring to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle [1]. If you are, then this shows a fundamental misunderstanding of it. The uncertainty principle describes a fundamental property of quantum systems. It has nothing to do with our measurement technology. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle
mhh__ 6y ago
To quote/paraphrase Leonard susskind: people have a habit of philosophizing rather than sciencifizing when it comes to consciousness. It's scientific question - or at least it is at the moment. Some people want to enshrine human intelligence (i.e. free will and quantum mechanics), which I think is naive without some kind of guiding principle (Fermi's "for a successful theory you need either a strong physical idea or a rigorous mathematical basis; you have neither" to a young Dyson) I remember being taught about this in a philosophy class, but I really can't help but not care - if it is technically possible I guess there will be a debate surrounding machine consciousness similar to transgender politics today (Uncomfortable to some but fine to - including me for the record - others).
friendlybus 6y ago
Do you think all there is to consciousness is biology? That's where the "accuracy" comes from, so if the respondent disagrees with that as a fundament, then it's a reasonable answer.
dehrmann 6y ago
This is what bugs me about the Turing test; it doesn't answer the important, hard question of AI: is something conscious, and to what extent does it have life.
- gfxgirl 6y ago
  The point of the Turing test is if you can't tell the difference then it doesn't matter. As of today you can't prove you're not in a simulation nor can you prove that every person you think is intelligent is not really an AI in that simulation. So similarly, if an AI exists and you can't tell it's an AI no matter how hard you try then there is no reasonable difference. The are effectively the same. The only point to Turing's test is to be double blind. You can't know before you start that the other side looks like a computer not a human or that they're voice is off or that if you cut them open they don't bleed blood etc. You have to make the test double blind and to do that a chat format is easiest.
- nytgop77 6y ago
  My interetation: This is the point made by Turing. One can only evaluate input/output. Analysis of methods/structure used by AI can not tell you if that intelligence is real or not, or is there a difference at all.
Yajirobe 6y ago
To quote John Searle: "Nobody supposes that the computational model of rainstorms in London will leave us all wet. But they make the mistake of supposing that the computational model of consciousness is somehow conscious. It is the same mistake in both cases."
- tim333 6y ago
  That seems rather a duff argument. Human weather forecasters predicting rain don't make us wet either. It doesn't show they are not conscious.
  - GuB-42 6y ago
    This is not about how human forecasters or computer weather models are conscious. The idea is if the cloud formations and rain generated by the model are indistinguishable from what you are seeing from your window. It doesn't mean that the model is actually producing rain. It may look the same on camera, but if you go outside, it is very different: only the real rain will make you wet. In the same way, if a computer behaves like a conscious entity. For example a chatbot acting like a human, as in a Turing test. It doesn't mean that the computer is conscious. Note that the computer may be conscious, but it is not a requirement in order to run a model. In the same way that a weather model could use actual water, but doesn't need to.
- bloak 6y ago
  According to Wikipedia, John Searle is known for sexual assault, sexual harassment, and the "Chinese room" argument. I'm not sure with which of these he's done the most harm, but I suspect he's done the most harm with his "Chinese room" argument, primarily through wasting people's time. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Chinese_room https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Chinese_room for some discussion, if you must, but I'd rather recommend people do something more useful instead.
  - Yajirobe 6y ago
    Could you point out exactly where I can see a sound refutation to the 'Chinese room'? I followed the wikipedia link but did not see any serious attempt to refute it - just one guy echoing what you've said. You sound a bit like many of the people who completely miss the point of the argument and insult it (or its author).
quantumsequoia 6y ago
"if the simulation is accurate, then the person you're simulating is conscious" Not necessarily. You can't treat a human as a black box, and then use inputs and outputs to definitively draw conclusions about what's going on inside the black box. You could potentially have two black boxes that give identical outputs for the same inputs, yet have completely different mechanisms inside for arriving at those outputs. For example, say you have someone who's very good at arithmetic able to multiply two numbers. You put him inside one black box and a pocket calculator inside another. You give each box two numbers and they both output the product. Both black boxes will give you identical outputs for any given input. You know the box with the person inside is conscious, but this is not enough information to conclude the other black box is conscious. "Consciousness" is not a descriptor of the outputs of a system. Consciousness is a descriptor of how it processes the inputs to arrive at the outputs. There is a thought experiment in psychology related to the subject called the p-zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie. "Such a zombie would be indistinguishable from a normal human being but lack conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object it would not inwardly feel any pain, yet it would outwardly behave exactly as if it did feel pain." You're basically arguing that it's impossible for a p-zombie to exist. That is the view some people hold, but arguing for that case is a lot more complex than simply saying its a tautology
- NoodleIncident 6y ago
  I didn't mention the inputs or outputs, I mentioned a perfect simulation in all biological details. That's the opposite of a black box, you'd be able to freely pause and inspect its behavior. So, I don't see why what you posted is relevant. As for P-Zombies, there would again be no difference between this brain, and a stranger you pass by on the street. Either of them could be a p-zombie, but we give other humans the benefit of the doubt; the same biology should lead to the same internal experience. Personally, I'm completely unconvinced by the p-zombie concept in general, but that's not relevant either.

Koshkin 6y ago

Indeed, it should be possible to simulate all the "required" physics on a computer. (Not that it's necessary.)

eranation 6y ago
My totally unsubstantiated and made up take on this is that perhaps consciousness happens in the quantum side of things that we can't either measure or really simulate because we can never really observe it, e.g. we can simulate quantum behavior quite well, but only based on the observed behavior, the particle side of the particle wave duality, we don't really know for sure what happens before the wave function collapses, we just know it's a probability space (which we can predict for repeated experiments very accurately, but we don't really know how to predict a single particle, we don't even know how to measure all of its properties at the same time let alone predict it). If consciousness happens in that no locality / no realism area of the unobserved quantum state, then perhaps this is why we can't simulate it with existing technology. I have no basis to this thought other than a hunch. It also somewhat helps explain determinism vs free will (although superdeterminism is also an explanation, one that I don't really like)
- centimeter 6y ago
  You’re throwing disconnected buzzwords around. The brain is too hot to rely on large-scale quantum entanglement. Any quantum effects that are relevant to the functioning of the brain are likely to be very small-scale and have some boring, easily-simulated effect like making ion pumps more efficient.
  - Koshkin 6y ago
    The logic appears to be simple: consciousness is mysterious, but so is quantum world, therefore they must intersect somehow.
- Avocadoe 6y ago
  "... we don't even know how to measure all of its properties at the same time ..." I assume you're referring to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle [1]. If you are, then this shows a fundamental misunderstanding of it. The uncertainty principle describes a fundamental property of quantum systems. It has nothing to do with our measurement technology. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

mhh__ 6y ago

To quote/paraphrase Leonard susskind: people have a habit of philosophizing rather than sciencifizing when it comes to consciousness. It's scientific question - or at least it is at the moment. Some people want to enshrine human intelligence (i.e. free will and quantum mechanics), which I think is naive without some kind of guiding principle (Fermi's "for a successful theory you need either a strong physical idea or a rigorous mathematical basis; you have neither" to a young Dyson) I remember being taught about this in a philosophy class, but I really can't help but not care - if it is technically possible I guess there will be a debate surrounding machine consciousness similar to transgender politics today (Uncomfortable to some but fine to - including me for the record - others).

friendlybus 6y ago

Do you think all there is to consciousness is biology? That's where the "accuracy" comes from, so if the respondent disagrees with that as a fundament, then it's a reasonable answer.

dehrmann 6y ago

This is what bugs me about the Turing test; it doesn't answer the important, hard question of AI: is something conscious, and to what extent does it have life.

gfxgirl 6y ago
The point of the Turing test is if you can't tell the difference then it doesn't matter. As of today you can't prove you're not in a simulation nor can you prove that every person you think is intelligent is not really an AI in that simulation. So similarly, if an AI exists and you can't tell it's an AI no matter how hard you try then there is no reasonable difference. The are effectively the same. The only point to Turing's test is to be double blind. You can't know before you start that the other side looks like a computer not a human or that they're voice is off or that if you cut them open they don't bleed blood etc. You have to make the test double blind and to do that a chat format is easiest.
nytgop77 6y ago
My interetation: This is the point made by Turing. One can only evaluate input/output. Analysis of methods/structure used by AI can not tell you if that intelligence is real or not, or is there a difference at all.

Yajirobe 6y ago

To quote John Searle: "Nobody supposes that the computational model of rainstorms in London will leave us all wet. But they make the mistake of supposing that the computational model of consciousness is somehow conscious. It is the same mistake in both cases."

tim333 6y ago
That seems rather a duff argument. Human weather forecasters predicting rain don't make us wet either. It doesn't show they are not conscious.
- GuB-42 6y ago
  This is not about how human forecasters or computer weather models are conscious. The idea is if the cloud formations and rain generated by the model are indistinguishable from what you are seeing from your window. It doesn't mean that the model is actually producing rain. It may look the same on camera, but if you go outside, it is very different: only the real rain will make you wet. In the same way, if a computer behaves like a conscious entity. For example a chatbot acting like a human, as in a Turing test. It doesn't mean that the computer is conscious. Note that the computer may be conscious, but it is not a requirement in order to run a model. In the same way that a weather model could use actual water, but doesn't need to.
bloak 6y ago
According to Wikipedia, John Searle is known for sexual assault, sexual harassment, and the "Chinese room" argument. I'm not sure with which of these he's done the most harm, but I suspect he's done the most harm with his "Chinese room" argument, primarily through wasting people's time. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Chinese_room https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Chinese_room for some discussion, if you must, but I'd rather recommend people do something more useful instead.
- Yajirobe 6y ago
  Could you point out exactly where I can see a sound refutation to the 'Chinese room'? I followed the wikipedia link but did not see any serious attempt to refute it - just one guy echoing what you've said. You sound a bit like many of the people who completely miss the point of the argument and insult it (or its author).

quantumsequoia 6y ago

"if the simulation is accurate, then the person you're simulating is conscious" Not necessarily. You can't treat a human as a black box, and then use inputs and outputs to definitively draw conclusions about what's going on inside the black box. You could potentially have two black boxes that give identical outputs for the same inputs, yet have completely different mechanisms inside for arriving at those outputs. For example, say you have someone who's very good at arithmetic able to multiply two numbers. You put him inside one black box and a pocket calculator inside another. You give each box two numbers and they both output the product. Both black boxes will give you identical outputs for any given input. You know the box with the person inside is conscious, but this is not enough information to conclude the other black box is conscious. "Consciousness" is not a descriptor of the outputs of a system. Consciousness is a descriptor of how it processes the inputs to arrive at the outputs. There is a thought experiment in psychology related to the subject called the p-zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie. "Such a zombie would be indistinguishable from a normal human being but lack conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object it would not inwardly feel any pain, yet it would outwardly behave exactly as if it did feel pain." You're basically arguing that it's impossible for a p-zombie to exist. That is the view some people hold, but arguing for that case is a lot more complex than simply saying its a tautology

NoodleIncident 6y ago
I didn't mention the inputs or outputs, I mentioned a perfect simulation in all biological details. That's the opposite of a black box, you'd be able to freely pause and inspect its behavior. So, I don't see why what you posted is relevant. As for P-Zombies, there would again be no difference between this brain, and a stranger you pass by on the street. Either of them could be a p-zombie, but we give other humans the benefit of the doubt; the same biology should lead to the same internal experience. Personally, I'm completely unconvinced by the p-zombie concept in general, but that's not relevant either.