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This whole theory seems like metaphysics because of this: it implies that among two systems with absolutely identical external behavior in all respects, one can

This whole theory seems like metaphysics because of this: it implies that among two systems with absolutely identical external behavior in all respects, one can have conscious and the other not have it. Fundamentally, we can simulate neuromorphic computer (or even a quantum computer, or even the entire human brain) on Von Neumann machine (with performance degradation). According to our current understanding of physics, the behavior of these systems should be identical in all respects except the simulation will be slower. However integrated information theory says that a neuromorphic computer may be highly conscious and the brain is most definitely highly conscious, but their simulation isn't. What's still unclear to me is whether this is indeed just metaphysics (i.e., the simulation and the real thing are absolutely identical and but we should still treat them differently from ethical standpoint), or is it a hypothesis about our physics (i.e., the brain somehow fundamentally cannot be simulated on a Von Neumann machine) as well as computational theory (i.e., neuromorphic or quantum computer cannot be simulated either).

ggggtez 6y ago
It doesn't help that quantum computers can be simulated with standard transistors (albeit much slower). Are we really arguing that speed of computation is now a pre-requisite for consciousness?
quantumsequoia 6y ago
"it implies that among two systems with absolutely identical external behavior in all respects, one can have conscious and the other not have it." That statement can be true without being metaphysical. You can't treat a human as a black box, and then use inputs and outputs to definitively draw conclusions about what's going on inside the black box. You could potentially have two black boxes that give identical outputs for the same inputs, yet have completely different mechanisms inside for arriving at those outputs. For example, say you have someone who's very good at arithmetic able to multiply two numbers. You put him inside one black box and a pocket calculator inside another. You give each box two numbers and they both output the product. Both black boxes will give you identical outputs for any given input. You know the box with the person inside is conscious, but this is not enough information to conclude the other black box is conscious. It's quite possible that there is a way to simulate human behavior through some other non-conscious mechanism. And just because we can't currently prove whether something is conscious doesn't mean it's something metaphysical we'll never be able to prove. For example, if two people tell you they're experiencing some pain, but one is lying about it, a few hundred years ago you'd be unable to prove it. That didn't mean pain is something metaphysical. Today, we know it might be possible to put both people in an MRI and prove whether they're actually feeling pain

ggggtez 6y ago

It doesn't help that quantum computers can be simulated with standard transistors (albeit much slower). Are we really arguing that speed of computation is now a pre-requisite for consciousness?

quantumsequoia 6y ago

"it implies that among two systems with absolutely identical external behavior in all respects, one can have conscious and the other not have it." That statement can be true without being metaphysical. You can't treat a human as a black box, and then use inputs and outputs to definitively draw conclusions about what's going on inside the black box. You could potentially have two black boxes that give identical outputs for the same inputs, yet have completely different mechanisms inside for arriving at those outputs. For example, say you have someone who's very good at arithmetic able to multiply two numbers. You put him inside one black box and a pocket calculator inside another. You give each box two numbers and they both output the product. Both black boxes will give you identical outputs for any given input. You know the box with the person inside is conscious, but this is not enough information to conclude the other black box is conscious. It's quite possible that there is a way to simulate human behavior through some other non-conscious mechanism. And just because we can't currently prove whether something is conscious doesn't mean it's something metaphysical we'll never be able to prove. For example, if two people tell you they're experiencing some pain, but one is lying about it, a few hundred years ago you'd be unable to prove it. That didn't mean pain is something metaphysical. Today, we know it might be possible to put both people in an MRI and prove whether they're actually feeling pain