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One non-obvious thing I really like about WebAuthn compared to PwdHash here is what happens when bad guys trick you into trying to give them credentials. I've n
by tialaramex 7y ago
One non-obvious thing I really like about WebAuthn compared to PwdHash here is what happens when bad guys trick you into trying to give them credentials. I've now implemented all this manually so that gives me more experience of the unhappy paths which obviously are hard to test on somebody else's site (if you don't want to risk getting banned).
Imagine you're signing into https://fake-google.example/ https://fake-google.example/ having been tricked into believing it is Google but with various different types of credentials:
* With a memorised password or similar strategy, you give them your actual Google credentials. Game over, you lose.
* With password managers you might realise there is something wrong because it doesn't auto-complete. But you might (for various reasons) give them your Google credentials, after all you've been tricked into believing this is Google. Game over, you lose.
* With PwdHash you give them PwdHash(Google Credentials). Reversing that to find your Google Credentials depends on your entropy choices. For good passwords you win, but most user passwords mean you lose if the bad guys put work in.
* With most "Second Factor" designs including SMS, TOTP, and many dongle designs you give them the second factor and again, you lose if the bad guys planned for this.
* But with WebAuthn its "cookies" (which bad guys can get from the real Google by presenting your username) are themselves site specific. Your FIDO authenticator needs a cookie, and it will implicitly need the cookie to match the rpId, your browser insists the rpId must match the origin FQDN of the web site (fake-google.example in this case) but that won't match google.com so the authentication cannot succeed. You cannot give the bad guys your Google credentials even if you really want to, maybe short of sending them the actual authenticator itself.
[ Do not UPS your Security Keys to bad guys. I think even my deceased grandmother could have figured that out, if I read stories about people being successfully tricked into doing this I may despair about our species entirely ]
- whatshisface 7y ago>if I read stories about people being successfully tricked into doing this I may despair about our species entirely You can't think in terms of "does happen" and "doesn't happen," you have to think in terms of "90% chance," "10% chance," "1% chance..." and so on. So many times I have seen people reject good measures by giving an argument to the effect of "Your system has a 1% chance of failure, which in my brain is stored as 'can fail,' so it's not an improvement over the old system that fails 30% of the time, which is also stored in my brain as 'can fail.'"
- Doxin 7y ago> Do not UPS your Security Keys to bad guys. I think even my deceased grandmother could have figured that out, if I read stories about people being successfully tricked into doing this I may despair about our species entirely You'd be surprised. Back in the day banks here used what amounts to a one-time pad as a second factor for auth. You'd wire money and the bank would ask you for code #37 on your one time pad. Each code would only ever be used once and if your codes were near to running out your bank would send you a new one time pad. A pretty clever and secure system you'd think. This of course didn't stop scammers from sending letters to people pretending to be their bank, asking if they could send in their old one-time pad and pin code in exchange for a new one time pad. Enough people fell for this for it to be an actual problem. It's not quite sending your security keys to the bad guys but it gets pretty close!