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Assuming that's even possible (how are those simulated brains going? As far as I can tell, we're up to 0.15% of a rat's brain), is a human consciousness separat

Assuming that's even possible (how are those simulated brains going? As far as I can tell, we're up to 0.15% of a rat's brain), is a human consciousness separated from its biological construct still a human consciousness? We're well out of the realm of science into science fiction, but I feel it's a valid question to ask - all of our consciousnesses have developed in ape bodies adapted for the savanna, with a bunch of survival related traits and sub-processes. If we remove our "selves" from our bodies, are we still us?

chispamed 7y ago
It's really difficult to draw a line between being our "selves" and the alternatives though. We are not the individual cells of our body because most of them will be replaced in the next weeks/months/years. We also don't think of any body with a knee replacement as any less human. Even altering the genetic code of a huge part of your body, like after stem cell transplantation, is not commonly seen as making us less us. Also suppose it was possible to build a synthentic neuron that behaved just like the ones inside your brain. If you started replacing your neurons with the synthetic ones, no individual neuron would "change" you. So were would you draw the line? At 10% synthetic neurons? At 20%? At 100%? If we see ourselves as biological beings another interesting point is how you would view a 1:1 copy of yourself. If we constructed a synthetic human that had the exact same number of molecules in the exact same place as you, would that human be you? (Leaving aside that that's basically impossible, just as a thought experiment) If you answered the last question with "no", that would also mean that not even the way we process information and think makes us us, since the 1:1 molecular clone would behave exactly the same as you in the same environment (in a purely deterministic universe at least, leaving aside probability and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). So are we instead an uninterrupted instance of a thinking process? That would allow us to differentiate us from the exact clone. However in that case, would you be another person after being unconsciousness? What about general anesthesia? This really keeps me up at night. It's next to impossible to define what we are and that we think of us as independent, unique beings might just be an illusion.
- mLuby 7y ago
  Good points. Nevertheless, until we have a convincing answer to this, I have to treat mind uploaders and destructive teleporters as murderboxes.
- lisper 7y ago
  > This really keeps me up at night. Why? You're pretty close to the right answer: > are we instead an uninterrupted instance of a thinking process? No, for the reasons you described. What we are is thinking-processes with a coherent series of more-or-less-uninterrupted links to the past. When you undergo general anesthesia you wake up as the same person because you can remember who you were before anesthesia, and you feel and act like that person. The interesting case is not anesthesia (or sleep) but amnesia and traumatic brain injury or mental illness that changes your personality.
  - chispamed 7y ago
    I understand where you're coming from, however I think that remembering the past is not a very helpful criterium since memories correspond to physical changes in the brain. In the thought experiment, the 1:1 molecular clone would have the same memories and think that he had lived through the same things as the original human for what it's worth. I'm not yet convinced that it is possible to define one self even though our (physiological) human experience definitely makes us feel like we were this clearly defined, independent, conscious thing. But of course the conditions you mention are also very interesting and make it non-trivial to define the "true" essence of the person. Another interesting one would be dementia.
    - lisper 7y ago
      > In the thought experiment, the 1:1 molecular clone would have the same memories and think that he had lived through the same things as the original human for what it's worth. That's right. Why is that a problem? Imagine you had this done to you, and imagine that in order to clone your brain you have to be put under anesthesia (because the process takes time and you need to capture a coherent snapshot). When you wake up, how are you going to tell whether you are the clone or the original?
hobs 7y ago
That's pretty much the same question we've been asking for two and a half thousand years (at least) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
Koshkin 7y ago
At least, it will think it’s you.
pb82 7y ago
There is the idea that consciousness cannot be expressed as a computational process (at least not a classical one) because computation is deterministic. We are a part of nature and nature seems to be unpredictable at the quantum level. Quantum states can not be predicted even when taking the whole past history of the universe into account. I think the free will lectures from John Conway also go in that direction: because some properties cannot be predetermined, free will must exist. Something must make a decision in order to have an outcome. This all goes far over my head and I may have misinterpreted the great John Conway. In that case I beg your pardon and would love to hear your thoughts on it.
deleted 7y ago
[deleted]

chispamed 7y ago

It's really difficult to draw a line between being our "selves" and the alternatives though. We are not the individual cells of our body because most of them will be replaced in the next weeks/months/years. We also don't think of any body with a knee replacement as any less human. Even altering the genetic code of a huge part of your body, like after stem cell transplantation, is not commonly seen as making us less us. Also suppose it was possible to build a synthentic neuron that behaved just like the ones inside your brain. If you started replacing your neurons with the synthetic ones, no individual neuron would "change" you. So were would you draw the line? At 10% synthetic neurons? At 20%? At 100%? If we see ourselves as biological beings another interesting point is how you would view a 1:1 copy of yourself. If we constructed a synthetic human that had the exact same number of molecules in the exact same place as you, would that human be you? (Leaving aside that that's basically impossible, just as a thought experiment) If you answered the last question with "no", that would also mean that not even the way we process information and think makes us us, since the 1:1 molecular clone would behave exactly the same as you in the same environment (in a purely deterministic universe at least, leaving aside probability and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). So are we instead an uninterrupted instance of a thinking process? That would allow us to differentiate us from the exact clone. However in that case, would you be another person after being unconsciousness? What about general anesthesia? This really keeps me up at night. It's next to impossible to define what we are and that we think of us as independent, unique beings might just be an illusion.

mLuby 7y ago
Good points. Nevertheless, until we have a convincing answer to this, I have to treat mind uploaders and destructive teleporters as murderboxes.
lisper 7y ago
> This really keeps me up at night. Why? You're pretty close to the right answer: > are we instead an uninterrupted instance of a thinking process? No, for the reasons you described. What we are is thinking-processes with a coherent series of more-or-less-uninterrupted links to the past. When you undergo general anesthesia you wake up as the same person because you can remember who you were before anesthesia, and you feel and act like that person. The interesting case is not anesthesia (or sleep) but amnesia and traumatic brain injury or mental illness that changes your personality.
- chispamed 7y ago
  I understand where you're coming from, however I think that remembering the past is not a very helpful criterium since memories correspond to physical changes in the brain. In the thought experiment, the 1:1 molecular clone would have the same memories and think that he had lived through the same things as the original human for what it's worth. I'm not yet convinced that it is possible to define one self even though our (physiological) human experience definitely makes us feel like we were this clearly defined, independent, conscious thing. But of course the conditions you mention are also very interesting and make it non-trivial to define the "true" essence of the person. Another interesting one would be dementia.
  - lisper 7y ago
    > In the thought experiment, the 1:1 molecular clone would have the same memories and think that he had lived through the same things as the original human for what it's worth. That's right. Why is that a problem? Imagine you had this done to you, and imagine that in order to clone your brain you have to be put under anesthesia (because the process takes time and you need to capture a coherent snapshot). When you wake up, how are you going to tell whether you are the clone or the original?

hobs 7y ago

That's pretty much the same question we've been asking for two and a half thousand years (at least) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus

Koshkin 7y ago

At least, it will think it’s you.

pb82 7y ago

There is the idea that consciousness cannot be expressed as a computational process (at least not a classical one) because computation is deterministic. We are a part of nature and nature seems to be unpredictable at the quantum level. Quantum states can not be predicted even when taking the whole past history of the universe into account. I think the free will lectures from John Conway also go in that direction: because some properties cannot be predetermined, free will must exist. Something must make a decision in order to have an outcome. This all goes far over my head and I may have misinterpreted the great John Conway. In that case I beg your pardon and would love to hear your thoughts on it.

deleted 7y ago

[deleted]