I think we're speaking past each other. What I'm trying to argue is that before we even talk about a scientific experiment, we have to ask "Is this question sci

I think we're speaking past each other. What I'm trying to argue is that before we even talk about a scientific experiment, we have to ask "Is this question scientifically well posed?" and that this question is unbelievably complex, to the point that you can't answer it ahead of time, so scientific activity will necessarily pursue questions it can't answer. And either it will give up on questions that are well posed but take an enormous amount of time to answer, or it will pursue forever questions that it can never answer because they don't even really make sense. I'm not going to try to elaborate on what the consequences of that would be for any given theory of science, I just want to show that whatever the difference is between science and pseudoscience, in the small scale they can look quite the same. Tangentially, the incompleteness theorems are not scientific knowledge according to Popper. They are metamathematical propositions that suppose the consistency of mathematics as one of their hypotheses. If they could be falsified, we would have discovered an inconsistency in mathematics, and so we have nevertheless validated the theorems. You literally can't falsify them.