> So is an investigation into whether pixel X on the screen will be shaded scientific? Popper would say no. If we reason that ZFC should be consistent via indu

> So is an investigation into whether pixel X on the screen will be shaded scientific? Popper would say no. If we reason that ZFC should be consistent via induction, we can predict that no pixel will ever show up. But this does not seem to be a "risky prediction" at all. Unenlightened by our theory, we would have no basis to expect a different result. Maybe the pixel shows up in an hour, or maybe it shows up long after we're dead. Maybe it never shows up, why not? > But [coupling science to decidability] doesn't seem useful to me, because it doesn't explain what it is that people who call themselves scientists applaud and what they frown on. That is it's not a very useful descriptivist framework. That is whether a question is decidable or not does not seem to be the criteria of whether a question is reasonable or not. Popper is surely rolling in his grave at this. Any falsifiable theory is "unilaterally decidable" to use his own words. This sounds much more like Kuhn.