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Samsung patches 0-click vulnerability impacting all smartphones sold since 2014
- aspenmayer 7y agoSVE-2020-16747 https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb CVE-2020-8899 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8899 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8899 From the issues page: Q: What privileges does the attacker gain in the system after a successful attack? A: The vulnerable codec executes in the context of the attacked app processing input images, so the attacker also gets the privileges of that app. In the case of my demo, that's Samsung Messages, which has access to a variety of personal user information: call logs, contacts, microphone, storage, SMS etc. While not explicitly tested, I also strongly suspect that local privilege escalation may be possible with the help of these bugs. For example, the highly privileged System UI process may display arbitrary images supplied by other apps in notifications, and I have observed it crash in Qmage-related code a number of times in my experimentation. === Q: Have you tested any attack vectors other than MMS? A: I haven't devised any end-to-end attacks similar to that via MMS, but as noted in the original bug report, all apps in the system which display untrusted images with the standard Bitmap interfaces are affected by these issues. For example, I have confirmed that the Qmage file which is used as the final payload to get a reverse shell via MMS, also gives the attacker remote access when it is copied to the device's file system and opened with the Gallery app. === Q: Are there any mitigations available to users against this and similar attacks, other than updating regularly? A: For Samsung devices, these issues are fixed in the May 2020 patch. Generally speaking of image codecs, I am not aware of any generic mitigations against these types of bugs. One easy way to mitigate against attackers using exploits delivered specifically through MMS is to disable the "auto retrieve" option for multimedia messages in the Messages app. From Mateusz Jurczyk of Google Project Zero‘s YouTube page: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nke8Z3G4jnc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nke8Z3G4jnc ‘This video demonstrates the exploitation of a vulnerability in the custom Samsung Qmage image codec via MMS. The exploit proof-of-concept achieves remote code execution with no user interaction on a Samsung Galaxy Note 10+ phone running Android 10 (February 2020 patch level). ‘Vulnerabilities in the Qmage format were reported by the Google Project Zero team to Samsung in January 2020, and were addressed in the Samsung May 2020 Security Bulletin as SVE-2020-16747. The bugs were also collectively assigned CVE-2020-8899. ‘For more details, see: * https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2002 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=20... - the original in-depth report discussing the codec and security issues. It also includes an FAQ section outlining how the exploit works. * https://github.com/googleprojectzero/SkCodecFuzz https://github.com/googleprojectzero/SkCodecFuzz [currently 404] - source code of the fuzzing harness used to identify the crashes. * https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb - Samsung Security Updates website.’