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But that's like half the point of SaltStack. It's supposed be secure enough to run on the public internet to manage road-warrior endpoints. "I found this site
by Spivak 7y ago
But that's like half the point of SaltStack. It's supposed be secure enough to run on the public internet to manage road-warrior endpoints.
"I found this site called Alexa that lists a bunch of companies that just straight up expose their web servers to the internet. Crazy."
And I have some bad news about how many companies are exposing their VPN servers to the internet too.
- tilolebo 7y agoIt's really not. You also wouldn't expose your database just because it's password-protected? I bet all these public servers have a firewall running to protect other services. Shouldn't be hard to include the saltstack port(s) and whitelist the relevant IP addresses. Also,the main difference with your example is that the clients that connect to webservers and vpns are either not known in advance or don't have static IP addresses.
- saltyguy22 7y agoYou can't really compare Salt to a password protected database. SSH is probably a better comparison as both use public key crypto and plenty of servers are exposed on the internet via it. Its just that salt hasn't been audited as heavily as OpenSSH or other implementations of SSH so its risky exposing Salt to the internet, but I can see why some admins might do that.
- Spivak 7y agoAnyone who's putting their Salt master on the internet is having to deal with clients without fixed addresses. And it's not uncommon to have to deal with clients that aren't known advance which is when autosign scripts are used. Sans the current CVE this is otherwise a service that is safe to expose to adversarial networks.
- tilolebo 7y agoFrom Algolia's outage retrospective: What we did so far: We’ve secured the impacted SaltStack service by updating it and adding additional IP filtering, allowing only our servers to connect to it. So clearly unrestricted access wasn't a necessity. I understand it's a pain, I've been running a 1000+ server stack with puppet on a public network and relied on iptables to secure it. But I'd rather cope with the daily iptable rules update than having to fight a 0-day exploit...
- lmm 7y agoI would (and do) expose my database to the internet, because it's properly secured (client certificates rather than just passwords). I don't run firewalls. If a service doesn't need to be exposed, the port isn't open. Means no worrying about who has access to the wifi (because that's outside the security boundary) and no mucking about with VPNs when accessing remotely.
- cat199 7y ago> road-warrior endpoints would or could often have a vpn tunnel back to some static infrastructure, this and not the public network can be used for mgmt
- Spivak 7y agoRight, except that registering with the salt master is how your VPN is provisioned.