7 ms·

By that logic, Google is aiding infringement.

colejohnson66 6y ago
Depending on who you ask, they are or aren’t.
hn_throwaway_99 6y ago
It's all about "primary purpose". The getpopcorntime website clearly shows that its primary purpose is to link to torrents to be able to watch free copyrighted movies. On the contrary, Google goes to great lengths now to make it harder to find free copyrighted content, and in any case Google has an easy case for its legal use.
- greglindahl 6y ago
  The DMCA law says nothing about contributory copyright infringement, only direct.
  - parsimo2010 6y ago
    This is a mostly false statement. There have been a few court rulings which have found people/corporations violated the DMCA by knowingly linking to infringing content. http://www.webtvwire.com/linking-to-infringing-content-is-probably-illegal-in-the-us/ http://www.webtvwire.com/linking-to-infringing-content-is-pr...
    - wtallis 6y ago
      The Supreme Court declared years ago that contributory infringement is not mentioned by the Copyright Act (as amended by the DMCA) and its only legal basis is common law precedent. The statement you rate as "mostly false" is actually an entirely accurate statement about the law of the land.
      - koheripbal 6y ago
        No, because the word "directly" is not in the law. Please cite you scotus ruling.
        wtallis 6y ago
        > No, because the word "directly" is not in the law. "Direct" is the term the judges have adopted to refer to the infringement that is explicitly defined by statute, due to the necessity of distinguishing it from the common law derived categories of contributory and vicarious infringement. The statute does not need to use the term "direct infringement" for that term to have real legal meaning. I've already quoted the Supreme Court on this elsewhere in the thread. The MGM v. Grokster case (2005) included: > When a widely shared product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, so that the only practical alternative is to go against the device’s distributor for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement. One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise the right to stop or limit it. Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for [another’s] infringement,” Sony, 464 U.S., at 434, these secondary liability doctrines emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law, e.g., id., at 486. Pp. 10—13. ( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-480.ZS.html https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-480.ZS.html ) The court is citing and quoting an earlier decision, Sony v. Universal City Studios (1984), the landmark case establishing that it was legal to use a VCR for timeshifting. That decision made numerous references to a distinction between direct and contributory infringement, such as: > Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed" to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contributory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner. ( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/464/417 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/464/417 ) And that's referring to a 1911 decision by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers ( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/222/55 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/222/55 ). So "direct infringement" is a pretty well-known concept despite not being named as such in statute.

Depending on who you ask, they are or aren’t.

It's all about "primary purpose". The getpopcorntime website clearly shows that its primary purpose is to link to torrents to be able to watch free copyrighted movies. On the contrary, Google goes to great lengths now to make it harder to find free copyrighted content, and in any case Google has an easy case for its legal use.

greglindahl 6y ago
The DMCA law says nothing about contributory copyright infringement, only direct.
- parsimo2010 6y ago
  This is a mostly false statement. There have been a few court rulings which have found people/corporations violated the DMCA by knowingly linking to infringing content. http://www.webtvwire.com/linking-to-infringing-content-is-probably-illegal-in-the-us/ http://www.webtvwire.com/linking-to-infringing-content-is-pr...
  - wtallis 6y ago
    The Supreme Court declared years ago that contributory infringement is not mentioned by the Copyright Act (as amended by the DMCA) and its only legal basis is common law precedent. The statement you rate as "mostly false" is actually an entirely accurate statement about the law of the land.
    - koheripbal 6y ago
      No, because the word "directly" is not in the law. Please cite you scotus ruling.
      - wtallis 6y ago
        > No, because the word "directly" is not in the law. "Direct" is the term the judges have adopted to refer to the infringement that is explicitly defined by statute, due to the necessity of distinguishing it from the common law derived categories of contributory and vicarious infringement. The statute does not need to use the term "direct infringement" for that term to have real legal meaning. I've already quoted the Supreme Court on this elsewhere in the thread. The MGM v. Grokster case (2005) included: > When a widely shared product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, so that the only practical alternative is to go against the device’s distributor for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement. One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise the right to stop or limit it. Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for [another’s] infringement,” Sony, 464 U.S., at 434, these secondary liability doctrines emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law, e.g., id., at 486. Pp. 10—13. ( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-480.ZS.html https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-480.ZS.html ) The court is citing and quoting an earlier decision, Sony v. Universal City Studios (1984), the landmark case establishing that it was legal to use a VCR for timeshifting. That decision made numerous references to a distinction between direct and contributory infringement, such as: > Justice Holmes stated that the producer had "contributed" to the infringement of the copyright, and the label "contributory infringement" has been applied in a number of lower court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred. In such cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the "contributory" infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner. ( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/464/417 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/464/417 ) And that's referring to a 1911 decision by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers ( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/222/55 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/222/55 ). So "direct infringement" is a pretty well-known concept despite not being named as such in statute.