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I'm saying that it could be wrong (as any and all things could be), not that it currently is. Im also aware of Asimov's essay on the topic of how wrong somethi

I'm saying that it could be wrong (as any and all things could be), not that it currently is. Im also aware of Asimov's essay on the topic of how wrong something can be. That being said, his point about getting less wrong really addresses one thing: theories are largely formed on predictive power and we improve over time as we collect more observations and attempt to address the inconsistencies between our theories and our observations to the contrary. As a result, since newer theories should have greater predictive power, they should be less wrong, and thus should have a higher probability of being correct. None of that, however, necessitates that the current theories should have a 100% probability of being correct. Keeping that in mind, it is worthwhile to realize that there are questions that can be asked today given our current level of understanding and observation that are simply nonsensical to ask in a prior time frame (easy example: asking "what is the band gap voltage of InGaAs?" in 1600 AD). This means that results that seem impossible at a given time frame (real time displays that render imagined worlds) become a simple question of how to in a different time frame. Putting this all together: we could definitely be wrong about anything. Sure, theories that seem consistent and have consistently provided good predictive power across most of not all current observations are useful, but they don't preclude new discoveries that could be even more correct and allow for things that we couldn't have previously considered possible.

lisper 6y ago
> it could be wrong (as any and all things could be), not that it currently is Unless you think the laws of physics can change over time, this is false. Unless the actual underlying laws of physics change with time, Einsteinian relativity at this moment is either correct or it is not. More to the point, the principle of relativity, i.e. that the laws of physics are the same in all reference frames, is either correct or it is not, and Maxwell's equations are either correct or they are not. My money is on all of these things being correct, which logically entails the impossibility of FTL signaling. Yes, any of these things could be wrong. And it might be possible to violate the second law of thermodynamics, and the earth could be flat, and Bigfoot might be real. Personally I put all of these things in the same category: the odds of any of them being true are indistinguishable from zero. But if you're feeling lucky, by all means, feel free to pursue any of them. I won't stand in your way. BTW... > theories are largely formed on predictive power No, scientific theories are selected according to their explanatory power, not their predictive power. Ptolemaic epicycles are a perfectly good predictive theory of planetary motion to within the margin of error of observation for several thousand years of human history. It is nonetheless absolutely without merit as a scientific theory because it purely descriptive, not explanatory.
- krapp 6y ago
  >Ptolemaic epicycles are a perfectly good predictive theory of planetary motion to within the margin of error of observation for several thousand years of human history. Except for Mercury. The math for Mercury's orbit didn't add up until general relativity came along and frame dragging could be taken into account[0]. This doesn't contradict your point, because Pluto's orbit was a sign of something that observable physics couldn't explain, pointing towards a more complete explanation. As far as I'm aware, there's no "hole" in physics that can only be explained by the existence of antigravity, and models in which it exists don't have the same or better explanatory power as current models. The fallacy here lies in looking back at the advance of science and assuming that because models were inaccurate before, they must always be arbitrarily inaccurate. Rather, the more we learn, the less likely it becomes that everything we know is entirely wrong, because any new models have to explain every observable facet of reality that the current one does as well as fill in gaps. [0]https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2015/11/25/how-einsteins-relativity-saved-the-solar-system/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2015/11/25/how-... Edit: I meant Mercury, not Pluto, and the other relativity. Oops.
  - lisper 6y ago
    > Except for Pluto. You mean Mercury. > The math for Pluto's orbit didn't add up until special relativity came along and frame dragging could be taken into account[0]. You mean general relativity. > the more we learn, the less likely it becomes that everything we know is entirely wrong Exactly.
    - krapp 6y ago
      Yes, I meant what I meant, not what I wrote...

lisper 6y ago

> it could be wrong (as any and all things could be), not that it currently is Unless you think the laws of physics can change over time, this is false. Unless the actual underlying laws of physics change with time, Einsteinian relativity at this moment is either correct or it is not. More to the point, the principle of relativity, i.e. that the laws of physics are the same in all reference frames, is either correct or it is not, and Maxwell's equations are either correct or they are not. My money is on all of these things being correct, which logically entails the impossibility of FTL signaling. Yes, any of these things could be wrong. And it might be possible to violate the second law of thermodynamics, and the earth could be flat, and Bigfoot might be real. Personally I put all of these things in the same category: the odds of any of them being true are indistinguishable from zero. But if you're feeling lucky, by all means, feel free to pursue any of them. I won't stand in your way. BTW... > theories are largely formed on predictive power No, scientific theories are selected according to their explanatory power, not their predictive power. Ptolemaic epicycles are a perfectly good predictive theory of planetary motion to within the margin of error of observation for several thousand years of human history. It is nonetheless absolutely without merit as a scientific theory because it purely descriptive, not explanatory.

krapp 6y ago
>Ptolemaic epicycles are a perfectly good predictive theory of planetary motion to within the margin of error of observation for several thousand years of human history. Except for Mercury. The math for Mercury's orbit didn't add up until general relativity came along and frame dragging could be taken into account[0]. This doesn't contradict your point, because Pluto's orbit was a sign of something that observable physics couldn't explain, pointing towards a more complete explanation. As far as I'm aware, there's no "hole" in physics that can only be explained by the existence of antigravity, and models in which it exists don't have the same or better explanatory power as current models. The fallacy here lies in looking back at the advance of science and assuming that because models were inaccurate before, they must always be arbitrarily inaccurate. Rather, the more we learn, the less likely it becomes that everything we know is entirely wrong, because any new models have to explain every observable facet of reality that the current one does as well as fill in gaps. [0]https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2015/11/25/how-einsteins-relativity-saved-the-solar-system/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2015/11/25/how-... Edit: I meant Mercury, not Pluto, and the other relativity. Oops.
- lisper 6y ago
  > Except for Pluto. You mean Mercury. > The math for Pluto's orbit didn't add up until special relativity came along and frame dragging could be taken into account[0]. You mean general relativity. > the more we learn, the less likely it becomes that everything we know is entirely wrong Exactly.
  - krapp 6y ago
    Yes, I meant what I meant, not what I wrote...