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This doesn't impact on the security promises CT gives us in practice because it's just one log and all extant CT policies require multiple logs. However some o
by tialaramex 7y ago
This doesn't impact on the security promises CT gives us in practice because it's just one log and all extant CT policies require multiple logs.
However some of the unfinished work on CT means that we're more vulnerable here than would be ideal.
For example: An adversary who does have the SCT private key can make any SCT. So they can make one which says this log saw a certificate last month, before their compromise, because that's just a date change and they get to pick what is signed. This claim would be untrue, but nobody would automatically notice that.
In theory the complete CT system could detect this SCT - at least probabilistically - because clients which are shown the SCT could periodically check whether a log consistent with that SCT actually exists and report mysterious SCTs that don't match. But that isn't yet built, a Chrome which is shown an SCT from a trusted log promising the certificate was logged last month just takes that as gospel truth.
Now for Google this is pretty satisfactory because their CT policy requires that you use their (Google's) logs. But for a third party like Apple it's a bit less comfortable. If the Google logs suffered a security breach, Apple has no reassurance that they would find there was a problem short of Google voluntarily letting them know.