2 ms·

The hosts are protected anyway by DMCA safe harbour provisions, just like if you uploaded an encrypted copy of an infringing file to Google Drive. > So, who is

by shawnz 7y ago

The hosts are protected anyway by DMCA safe harbour provisions, just like if you uploaded an encrypted copy of an infringing file to Google Drive. > So, who is hosting the derivative data? Y, possibly Y, definitely. Like you said yourself, Y's data is derived from A. > both A1 and A2 look like random data, there's no way to tell which is the random one. Any encryption scheme will cause the file to look like random data. All that means is that seeing the file contents alone is not enough to prove the crime. It doesn't mean that the file contents become free of infringement.

Chris2048 7y ago
Does any host get safe harbour, or just the big ones with lawyers? In any case, encryption schemes have keys, distinct from data and generated during encryption. In this case, there are two sets of data, either of which could be key or data, and one of which could of been generated before, and independently of the other. In fact, for any data block A, and random data X - there is a block Y that combines with X to produce A - any/all A, any/all X.
- shawnz 7y ago
  Y's data is obviously the data and X's data is obviously the key. It doesn't matter if you can tell that just by looking at the data or just by looking at the key. What you can tell just by looking at the data is irrelevant, that is what I am saying. > In fact, for any data block A, and random data X - there is a block Y that combines with X to produce A - any/all A, any/all X. That is true with basically any encryption scheme, the only peculiarity here is that key and data are the same length (which is irrelevant to the legality of the situation anyway).
  - Chris2048 7y ago
    > what you can tell just by looking at the data is irrelevant Why? hosting derivative work is illegal, hosting random data (keys) isn't, the distinction between X's data and Y's data is the distinction between liable and not-liable. If you can't tell which is which, then both are innocent under reasonable doubt. > That is true with basically any encryption scheme What's isn't true is the ease with which the A can be generated from X given Y. In other encryption schemes, key and data are distinct components - and not just by size.
    - shawnz 7y ago
      Because looking at the bits themselves is just one way of many to prove beyond a reasonable doubt what someone was trying to accomplish in the first place. In fact having the bits themselves doesn't even necessarily prove anything. If someone puts a murder weapon in my possession without my knowledge, does that make me guilty? > In other encryption schemes, key and data are distinct components Key and data are distinct components here too. You said yourself you generated the key data with no knowledge of the infringing content, so that makes them distinct. Size of the key is the only difference with this scheme compared to more typical ones.
      - Chris2048 7y ago
        I'd say showing a host is hosting a copyrighted file is the main way this is proven, and it's hard to host a file without broadcasting evidence of guilt. This is in no way comparable to possessing a murder weapon. > You said yourself you generated the key data with no knowledge of the infringing content, so that makes them distinct. The 'key' differs by history, which isn't know from looking at the bits. There is no way to distinguish which is the key without knowing how they where generated. But by "distinct" I mean that you cannot switch the roles of key and encrypted data in most encryption schemes, that is not true in this case. > Size of the key is the only difference with this scheme compared to more typical ones. That's not true, in traditional schemes the key of any size is still the key in how it's used to decrypt the encrypted data; you cannot decrypt the key using the encrypted data as a key; this is not true for OFFsystem - there is no key/data distinction, if E is the decryption function then E(A, B) = E(B, A)
    - xg15 7y ago
      > If you can't tell which is which, then both are innocent under reasonable doubt. Nope. X is still hosting infringing content (I doubt this would even be considered derivative and not simply the encrypted original), this just made the proof harder. But "it could theoretically have happened differently" is not "reasonable doubt" if this possibility is highly unlikely in face of all other evidence. A thief doesn't get out free because the thing "could have accidentally dropped into his bag". You're demanding that the court, should only look at the tiny piece of the puzzle that you provide. They have no reason to do so. In this case, I'd assume, instead of diving into the technicalities of the algorithm, they'd be more interested in the fact that the openly stated purpose of the whole system is to circumvent copyright.
- gnopgnip 7y ago
  Any host gets safe harbor as long as they accept DMCA takedown notices and respond to them within a reasonable amount of time. You don't need a lawyer to comply with this law in general, but if you are in the business of hosting legally dubious content you will need lawyers one way or another.

by shawnz 7y ago

Chris2048 7y ago

Does any host get safe harbour, or just the big ones with lawyers? In any case, encryption schemes have keys, distinct from data and generated during encryption. In this case, there are two sets of data, either of which could be key or data, and one of which could of been generated before, and independently of the other. In fact, for any data block A, and random data X - there is a block Y that combines with X to produce A - any/all A, any/all X.

shawnz 7y ago
Y's data is obviously the data and X's data is obviously the key. It doesn't matter if you can tell that just by looking at the data or just by looking at the key. What you can tell just by looking at the data is irrelevant, that is what I am saying. > In fact, for any data block A, and random data X - there is a block Y that combines with X to produce A - any/all A, any/all X. That is true with basically any encryption scheme, the only peculiarity here is that key and data are the same length (which is irrelevant to the legality of the situation anyway).
- Chris2048 7y ago
  > what you can tell just by looking at the data is irrelevant Why? hosting derivative work is illegal, hosting random data (keys) isn't, the distinction between X's data and Y's data is the distinction between liable and not-liable. If you can't tell which is which, then both are innocent under reasonable doubt. > That is true with basically any encryption scheme What's isn't true is the ease with which the A can be generated from X given Y. In other encryption schemes, key and data are distinct components - and not just by size.
  - shawnz 7y ago
    Because looking at the bits themselves is just one way of many to prove beyond a reasonable doubt what someone was trying to accomplish in the first place. In fact having the bits themselves doesn't even necessarily prove anything. If someone puts a murder weapon in my possession without my knowledge, does that make me guilty? > In other encryption schemes, key and data are distinct components Key and data are distinct components here too. You said yourself you generated the key data with no knowledge of the infringing content, so that makes them distinct. Size of the key is the only difference with this scheme compared to more typical ones.
    - Chris2048 7y ago
      I'd say showing a host is hosting a copyrighted file is the main way this is proven, and it's hard to host a file without broadcasting evidence of guilt. This is in no way comparable to possessing a murder weapon. > You said yourself you generated the key data with no knowledge of the infringing content, so that makes them distinct. The 'key' differs by history, which isn't know from looking at the bits. There is no way to distinguish which is the key without knowing how they where generated. But by "distinct" I mean that you cannot switch the roles of key and encrypted data in most encryption schemes, that is not true in this case. > Size of the key is the only difference with this scheme compared to more typical ones. That's not true, in traditional schemes the key of any size is still the key in how it's used to decrypt the encrypted data; you cannot decrypt the key using the encrypted data as a key; this is not true for OFFsystem - there is no key/data distinction, if E is the decryption function then E(A, B) = E(B, A)
  - xg15 7y ago
    > If you can't tell which is which, then both are innocent under reasonable doubt. Nope. X is still hosting infringing content (I doubt this would even be considered derivative and not simply the encrypted original), this just made the proof harder. But "it could theoretically have happened differently" is not "reasonable doubt" if this possibility is highly unlikely in face of all other evidence. A thief doesn't get out free because the thing "could have accidentally dropped into his bag". You're demanding that the court, should only look at the tiny piece of the puzzle that you provide. They have no reason to do so. In this case, I'd assume, instead of diving into the technicalities of the algorithm, they'd be more interested in the fact that the openly stated purpose of the whole system is to circumvent copyright.
gnopgnip 7y ago
Any host gets safe harbor as long as they accept DMCA takedown notices and respond to them within a reasonable amount of time. You don't need a lawyer to comply with this law in general, but if you are in the business of hosting legally dubious content you will need lawyers one way or another.