As far as I can tell, Searle's physicalism takes the form of regarding mind as a property of physical brains, analogously to how water has the wetting property.

As far as I can tell, Searle's physicalism takes the form of regarding mind as a property of physical brains, analogously to how water has the wetting property. It is certainly true that a purely digital model of a conscious brain could not perform any of the physical actions that a conscious person can do, such as actually move chess pieces, but the addition of actuators for such interventions in the physical world is not conceptually problematical, and clearly beside the point. Talk of properties, without inquiring more deeply, was pilloried by Molière in a rather well-known comment: "It is asked what the cause and reason are of opium's making one sleep. "To which I respond: because there is in it a dormitive virtue whose nature it is to put the senses to sleep." It also tends to give rise to positions such as a disbelief that iron ships could float, on the grounds that iron, unlike wood, lacks the buoyancy property. The generalized fallacy here lies in taking a lack of knowledge for proof that something is necessarily the case. There is no need to feel bad about disagreeing wth Searle - he is not lacking in self-confidence, and I imagine he would laugh at the thought.